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"Your brain is füll of rotten-wool". "You mean cotton-
wool," Sophie said. "What I mean and what I say is two
different things", the BFG announced rather grandly.
Roald Dahl, The BFG, 1982; eh. "Snozzcumbers"
1 . Introduction
From the earliest beginnings of their literature (ca. 800 BCE), the Greeks
betray an awareness of the medium they are using to express themselves.
Implicitly at first, but with increasing elaboration later on, they investigate
the relationship between language and the world around us, and between
language and thought. Beyond these first explorations, the context of the
Greek polis or city-state saw the development of a theory of rhetoric,
analysing the persuasive potential of discourse, and a poetics that focused
on the psychagogic and didactic functions of language. Logic, instrumental
to all scholarly and scientific activities, dealt with language from the point
of view of validity and truth value. Moreover, äs Greece developed from an
oral to a (more) literate society, the philological study of (mainly poetic) texts
became increasingly important. Although the communicative function of
language was never lost from sight, and the problem of signification (often
coupled with that of the essential nature of language) formed a central con-
cern, no autonomous semantics, i.e. a theory of meaning without extra-lin-
guistic concerns (see Leech 1981:4), ever developed. Since language was
never supposed to be an end in itself, it did not get to be studied for its own
sake until the hesitating emergence of 'technical grammar' in the 2nd/ist
centuries BCE . Even in that period, however, the only specimens of 'technical
grammar' are school grammars, which offer no more than a basic framework
for quick reference and rehearsal: their content seems not to have been
studied for its own sake but äs an auxiliary to the study of the poets, itself
a propaedeutic stage leading to the study of rhetoric.
However, this does not mean that the Greeks had no semantic theories;
it just implies that the study of 'meaning' was taken up in different contexts
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with specific requirements. Nonetheless, this resulted in a variety of purely
linguistic insights, and the development of a quite specific semantic termi-
nology (Section 2): initially, there was the instinctive concern to understand
the world through the medium of the words or names denoting items in it.
This concern was reflected in the practice of etymology, the attempt to grasp
the complete meaning of a word, which will be discussed in Section 3. Inter-
preting 'words' and interpreting the spoken or written 'texts' of the gods
(oracles, dreams) or of great authoritative poets of the past, are in a sense
related activities. Some early exegetical techniques will be discussed in Sec-
tion 4.
A number of fundamental issues to do with the nature of language were
taken up in intellectual circles in the 6th and 5th centuries BCE, discussed in
Section 5. The debate focused on the question of language's reliability äs a
source of knowledge, its 'correctness'. Is there a natural connection between
a thing and its name, or is language completely arbitrary and conventional?
Since Plato's (427-347 BCE) whole philosophy was ultimately based on
his belief in fixed ethical norms, he had to take up the challenge posited by
the relativist point of view held by some of the sophists. A total lack of
stability in language would render it unsuitable äs the vehicle of philosophical
inquiry. On the other hand, Plato's commitment to the process of dialectics
meant that he could not embrace the other extreme either. His dialectical
method implied making use of words, not blindly relying on them äs equiva-
lents of a 'truth' they could not possibly contain. This dilemma produced the
Cratylus, discussed in Section 6.
In his turn, Aristotle (384-322 BCE) took up questions of language and
meaning in a number of different contexts, with Plato's work looming large
in the background. Always focusing on the functions language was supposed
to fulfil in different circumstances, he sketched an outline of a semantic
theory that was to bear fruit for centuries to come. Clearly and apodictically
he stated the difference between having meaning and being true, thus for the
first time restricting the notion of semanticity to the purely linguistic level,
no ontological or logical strings attached. Although anticipated by Plato, it
was Aristotle's formulation of the principle that words do not signify things
immediately, but only through the filter of the Speaker's mind, that would
be the major influence on medieval linguistic thought (Section 7).
Section 8 deals with the Hellenistic period (3rd/2nd centuries BCE), with
the revolutionary logical work by the Stoics, and the theory of meaning de-
veloped by Epicurus. Intriguingly, linguistic notions are narrowly bound up
with the ethical theories held by both schools. This period also saw the
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spectacular rise of philology with the Institution of the Alexandrian Museum.
The skeletal remains of the work of Zenodotus (fl. ca. 284 BCE), Aristo-
phanes (ca. 257-180 BCE) and Aristarchus (ca. 217-145 BCE) still provide
fascinating glimpses of the nature of their exegetical work, but hardly any
vestiges of truly semantic interests remain. As philology gained in popularity
and intellectual prestige, it came to be adopted by specialists in other fields,
primarily by de jtors and philosophers, äs a method of dealing with authorita-
tive texts.
Section 9 is a discussion of the development of semantics äs the basis for
a syntactic theory in Apollonius Dyscolus.
Section 10 briefly focuses on a Latin author: in the work of Augustine
(354-430) we find a theory of meaning originating in a blend of philosophi-
cal, linguistic and theological concerns.
Section 11 ends the main body of this essay with an overview of ancient
theories of translation. It is followed by a conclusion (12), suggestions for
further reading (13) and a list of bibliographical references (14). Since we
are mainly interested in the emergence of semantics, most attention will be
given to the early periods and the conditions for the development of theories
of meaning.
2. Terminology
The main Greek verbs meaning "to mean" are deloö/deloün "to make
clear", and semainö/semainein "to signify, to give a sign" (on these verbs
plus derivatives see Manetti 1987:84). Neither is used exclusively to denote
verbal or vocal signification. Any kind of sign may be indicated by them. In
an early text like that of Heraclitus (5th Century BCE) B 93, an Opposition is
feit between legein "to say", and semainein "to signify" (contra Calboli
1992):
"the lord who owns the oracle in Delphi does not speak, nor does he hide, but he signi-
fies" (ho anax hoü to mantewn esti to en Delphots, oute legei oute kruptei allä
semainei, Heracl. Fr. B 93).
Semeion "sign" is formed from the same root sem- that is also in semainö
"to signify"; it may be used for the formal aspects of a word (e.g. Plato Crat.
427c8 setnewn te kai onoma "a sign and name"). The same goes for sema
"sign", possibly used for a linguistic sign in Parmenides Fragment B 8.2.
Conceptually related is the use of sumbolon "symbol", e.g. in Diodorus
Siculus 1,8,1 (going back to the 5th-century philosopher Democritus): when
the unarticulated and meaningless (asemou) stream of sound is articulated
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and assigned fixed referents, i.e. when it is turned into Symbols proper
(swmöo/α), language becomesarecognizable instrumentier communication.
Aristotle, too, makes uses of the concept of the symbol to explain the relation-
ship between (spoken) language and thought, and between spoken and written
language: "The things that are in the voice are Symbols of the affections in
the soul, and written things are Symbols of the things that are in the voice"
(Esti men oün tä en telphönel ton en tei psukhei pathematön sumbola, kal
tä graphomena ton en tei phönet, De Interpretatione l6a3f.) (cf. semela,
"signs" i6a6; the words seem to be used interchangeably in this passage).
The Greeks have no separate expression for "to mean" äs conveying the
intention of the Speaker (ex.: I mean A, not B); they use the verb legein, "to
say". In later Greek, intention on the macro-level (Intention of a text or a
section of a text) may also be expressed by the noun skopos, "mark, goal".
As a noun, "meaning" is most frequently tö deloumenon "that which is
made clear", or tö semainomenon "that which is signified". Both are sub-
stantivized passive participles from the verbs mentioned above. The corre-
sponding active participles are to deloün "that which makes clear", and to
semamon "that which signifies". They are used to refer to the form of the
word (äs opposed to its content or meaning). This formal or sound aspect is
also indicated by phöne "(articulated) voice", which is unrelated to the idea
of "sign". On the other hand, it has a specific link with linguistics (viz. vocal
sound) which the others lack. Plato' s Cratylus also features a different verbal
noun from the root delo-, viz. delöma "a means of making clear, that which
makes clear, indication", possibly selected because it is linked with the
similarly formed mimema "imitation" (42^6; cf. 433b2; 433di; 43532).
Delöma "a means of making known, indication" is also used in Plato's
Sophist, where two kinds of "vocal indications of being" (ton teiphöneipen
ten ousian delömatön) are distinguished: names and verbs/predicates. A pred-
icate (rhema) is taken äs the indication (delöma) which relates to actions, a
narne is the vocal sign (semeion tes phönes, obviously meant äs a synonym
of delöma here) applied to those who perform the action in question. Instead
of delöma, Epicurus and his school use delösis, "indication", a nomen
actionis from the same root delo-. An alternative for "meaning" from the
root sem(a)- is semasia (e.g. Chrysippus apud Galen On the Doctrines of
PlatoandHippocrates2.5.15,p. 130,24DeLacy; ScholiaonDionysiusThrax
516.2ff.; 616.13-27). A third Greek verb meaning "to show" isphainö: its
cömpound emphainö "to give to understand", and the Substantive emphasis
"meaning, significance" are usually employed to indicate the extra informa-
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tion that is conveyed by an expression, over and above its lexical meaning
(see e.g. Quintilian 8.3.83).
The use of the verb dunasthai ("to be able, strong enough to") in the sense
of "to be equivalent to, to mean" is first attested in Herodotus Histories
4.11 o "The Scyths call the Amazons Oiorpata'; that name means (dunatai)
men-killers in Greek. For they call a man Oior' and 'pata' is to kill" (tas de
Amazonas kaleousi hol Skuthai Oiorpata, dunatai de tö onoma toüto katä
Hellada glossan androktonoi; owr gär kaleousi andra, tö depatä kleinem).
The Substantive dunamis "power, ability, meaning" is used in connection
with letters, syllables, rhythms and harmonies by the sophist Hippias (Fr. A
11), and in the Cratylus 394b-c it Stands for a name's value, reflecting the
essence of the thing the name refers to.
Apart from these words from the verbal roots delo- "to make clear", se-
m(a(i)n)- "toindicate",pha(i)n- "toshow",anddunasthai "tobeequivalent
to", words connected with 'mental processes' also come to be used äs techni-
cal terminology for the semantic level of language. Their connotation is
completely different from the group of words related to "signaling, sign-
giving ". Signs can refer directly to an element from reality, words like dianoia
"thought, intention", and ennoia "reflection, notion, conception"; hence:
"sense of a word", add a psychological or intentional level: a word is the
vehicle of a 'thought', either of a Speaker, or in the abstract. The 'thought' of
the word is its meaning. Dianoia and ennoia are related to the Greek word for
"mind", noüs (itself used äs "meaning" in Dionysius Thrax, Tekhne 6.8).
Dianoia "thought, intention" features e.g. in Plato's Cratylus 41837: "they
change the meanings of the names", alloioüsi tas tön onomatön dianoias, cf.
ibid. 41809 "the intention of the namegiver", ten dianoian toü themenou.
Ennoia "reflection, notion, conception; hence: sense of a word", becomes
one of the common words to signify "meaning" in later Greek. In the 2nd-
century-CE grammarian Apollonius Dy scolus, it is used for all the conceptual
aspects of a word, its semantic and syntactic values (Sluiter 1990:97). But it
also occurs in the historian Dio Cassius (2nd/3rd Century CE):
[Verus showed exceptional strength of character:] "This led Hadrian to apply to the
young man the name ' Verissimus' ["Truest"], thus playing upon the meaning (ennoia)
of the Latin word" (aph' hoükat Ouerissimon auton, prös ten toüRhömäikoü rhematos
ennoian kompseuomenos, apekalei, Dio Cassius Roman History 69.21 [tr. Cary]).
According to the i st-century-BCE literary critic Dionysius of Halicarnassus,
we signify (semainomeri) our thoughts (noeseis) by speech (lexis) (On Liter-
ary Composition 3).
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Form-meaning and form-referent oppositions can be expressed in a variety
of ways, äs the following scheme shows (cf. Ax 1982):
Form Meaning Referent
onoma prägma
psophos semainomenon
lexis logos
lexis ennoia
lexis noesis
lexis/phönel lektonlprägmal tunkhanon
semamon semainomenon
Iprolepsis
The oldestcombinationis onoma "name" andprägma "(extra-linguistic)
thing". A typical combination of terminology can be found in the Cratylus
once again: "It is completely irrelevant whether there is a letter extra, or one
missing, äs long äs the essence of the thing (prägma) which is made clear
in the name (onoma) is valid" (oud' ei proskeitai ti gramma e apheiretai,
ouden oude toüto, heös an enkrates ei he ousia toü pragmatos deloumene
en toi onomati, Crat. 393d2ff.).
In hisRhetoric 111,2.1405b8, Aristotle opposes theeffects reached "in the
sounds" (enpsophois) to those "in the meaning" ((en) töl semainomenöi).
The Stoics oppose lexis'' string of sounds" (regarded from the formal side)
to logos, "meaningful speech". In rhetorical theory lexis is coupled with
ennoia (äs "diction" versus "thought",e.g. inHermogenes On the Qualities
of Style 2.4). Lexis in later Greek comes to mean "word", a more general
alternative for onoma "name", and rhema, "word, verb (predicate)". In a
grammatical context logos develops into "complete utterance, sentence".
The Stoics add another lexical element from the root leg-/log- "to speak,
speech": To lekton "the sayable, that which can be said, that which is said"
comes to stand for the incorporeal meaning, mediating between the corporeal
word-form (lexis, phöne, semamon) and the ref erent in reality (ίο tunkhanon,
probably intended originally äs "that which has the quality signified (by the
noun)", or maybe "that which gets a case/name"; later feit äs "something
which happens to be there". Lekton is more specific than semainomenon.
It is the meaning in so far äs it can be uttered in speech. This complicated
notion will be discussed in Section 8. In Stoic theory, prägma "thing",
acquires a completely different Status. It does not refer to extra-linguistic
reality, but signifies the (incorporeal) content of a lekton. Thus, lekton and
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prägma come to be complementary; both refer to the incorporeal meaning,
but the one Stresses its language-related aspect, the other its reality-related
side. In technical grammarprägma is associated especially with the meaning
of verbs.
The closest equivalent to a concept of 'meaning' contributed by Epicurus
(341-270 BCE) and his school seems to be the notion ofprolepsis "precon-
ception, common notion", which mediales between words and things. How-
ever, the term itself does not belong to the semantic field of 'meaning'.
The Latin terminology corresponds closely to the Greek. Meaning is
expressedby verbs meaning "toshow": ostendere andsignificare (e.g. Varro
On the Latin Language 5.3). Substantives derived from significare are signi-
ficatio (e.g. Varro ibid. 9.40; SenecaLeiters 89.17 (opposed to vox (=phöne)
and to verba respectively)) and significatus (e.g. the title of M. Verrius
Flaccus' (istcenturiesBCE/CE) lexicographical workDe significatuverborum
"On the meaning of words"). Other derivations from significare "to mean,
to signify ", are significabilis and significans "capable of conveying meaning,
significant".
As the Greek can use dunamis and dunasthai, Latin has vis "force, mean-
ing" and valere "to be equivalent to, to mean". And Latin also uses words
derived from the semantic field of thought processes/perception to indicate
meaning: sensus (e.g. Ovid Fasti 5.484; Quintilian 6.3.48 verba duos sensus
significantia "words with two meanings"). In a rhetorical context sententia
"meaning" is opposed to the "letter" of a law or other written document.
The form-meaning Opposition is expressed by couples like vox l forma l
verbum l nomen l vocabulum—res; forma—res; fades—vis (Seneca Leiters
9.2.3); vox—significatio etc.
Augustine forms dicibile on the model of lekton, but this term never
enjoyed much popularity.
3. Folk linguistics, etymology, magic: the meaning of names
Archaic Greece was an oral society. This means that the Community was kept
together by oral communication and that orally transmitted tradition lay at
the basis of all functions and institutions. Oral and literate societies differ
significantly in the ways they address the natural human need for points of
orientation in past and present. Oral tradition fulfils the role that written
record does in a literate society, but it is a completely different medium,
because of its flexibility and the absence of any fixed form. Every time a story
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is retold, it is in fact created anew. The important role of poets in such a
society has attracted a lot of scholarly attention over the last two decades.
They embody the collective memory, and thus the history, of the group, and
their role is to a large extent that of visionary teachers of the people. Their
poetry provides or preserves the points of reference necessary to strengthen
feelings of group identity and of orientation in the world. While dealing with
events from the past, one of its main functions is to help people understand
the Status quo.
Various strategies for acquiring such a sense of control over the present
can be recognized in early Greek poetry. Its very medium, language itself,
formed an obvious starting-point. Being traditional itself, it was thought to
contain clues äs to how the world worked. Names could generate myths (cf.
Kraus 1987:18; Leclerc 1993:271). For example, the story about an earth-
born people may have originated in the word laoi "people", which was feit
to be somehow associated in meaning with läas "stone". The myth then
explains how once upon a time a people of men was born from the stones
buried in the earth, and it was corroborated by the similarity of names—which
probably triggered the story in the first place. The same may go for the name
Penelope, which derives frompenelops "duck", but was connected wiihpene
"woof" and lope "robe, mantle": here, either the name may have generated
the myth of the heroine who spun a robe by day and undid her work by night,
or the other way around: the myth was there and a suitable name for its
protagonist was devised (Peradotto 1990:107-108). Mythology—sometimes
combined with etymology—is one of the strategies to gain control over the
present. The same goes for (mythical) genealogy, especially the ones that
eventually produce a god or hero äs the ultimate forebear, a fixed and stable
pointof reference ifever there was one (cf. Thomas 1989; Leclerc 1993:258).
Etymology came in because an understanding of names was taken to imply
an understanding of the corresponding realities.
This same presupposition explains certain magical practices in which names
and things named do not essentially differ from each other (Kraus 1987: igf.).
It is also apparent in the common folktale motif of hiding one's real name:
allowing somebody to know your name means giving him power over your
person (cf. Odysseus' trick of introducing himself to the Cyclops äs "No-
body" (Odyssey 9.366). When Romulus founded the city of Rome, he alleg-
edly invented three names for it, a "political" one (namely "Roma",
"Strength"), a sacerdotal one ("Flora", "flourishing"), and amystical one
that could only be used by priests and should never be divulged to the people.
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One priest who did so any way was put to death The secret name was "Love",
Amor, the InversionofRotna (Job Lydus,OntheMonths, 125 2ff Wuensch)
There is a lot of implicit, and some exphcit, linguisüc thought in Homer
(8th Century BCE) and Hesiod (around 700 BCE), although the two are not
in the same class m this respect Hesiod is far more self-conscious äs a poet,
and the attention he pays to problems of meanmg is related to the didactic
nature of his work Both poets know that names—the most important objects
foi etymologizmg by far throughout Antiquity—can be significant The word
they use to designate such a name is "eponym(ous)" (epönumos), used foi
a name in so far äs it relates to something eise Thus, m the Odyssey it is told
how his maternal grandfather gave Odysseus his name
' My daughter' s husband and my daugher, give him whatsoever name I say Lo, masmuch
äs I am come hither äs one that has been angered (odussamenos) with many, both men
and women over the fruitful earth, therefore let the name by which the child is named
be Odysseus" (Gambrosemosthugaterte tithesth onom hotnkeneipö /polloisin gar
egöge odussamenos tod' hikanö/andiasm edegunaixmana khthonapouluboteiran /ίδϊ
d Oduseus onom' estö epönumon, Odyssey 19 40ötf, tr Murray)
"Odysseus" was feit to be linked with odussomai "tobewrothagamst", and
it reflected his grandfather's attitude to the world, but it turned out to be
relevant to Odysseus' unenviable personal fate äs well, the fate of someone
hated by gods and men This seems to be imphed m Athena' s question to Zeus
"Wherefore then didst thou conceive such wrath (odusao) agamst him, O Zeus''" (n
nu hoi toson odusao Zeü?, Odyssey l 62, tr Murray)
In the same passage, Homer hmts at a connection between "Odysseus" and
oduromai "to lament" The one association does not exclude the other
There are many mstances of etymologizmg in Homer Especially the cases
where someone or something has more than one name, make it obvious to
look for meanmg in the extra name
Him, Hector called Skamandnos but the rest called him Astyanax (ruler of the city)
For Hector was the only protector of Troy' (ton rh Hektar kaleeske Skamandnon
autar hoi alloi/Astuanakt ows gar erueto Ihon Hektar, Ihad 6 402f)
In this example, Hector has called his son after Troy's main nver, the Ska-
mander, and the other Trojans have found a name for the young pnnce that
not only honours his father, but also expresses their hopes that Astyanax will
take over his father' s role äs Troy' s champion The etymology gives rhuomai
"to protect" äs a vanant on -anax "ruler", while Astu- "city" Stands for
flios "Troy"
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Other cases of double names are caused by the fact that men and gods use
different names. One would expect the names of the gods to be especially
'truthful', but they are either entirely opaque or their relevance is unclear;
the poet knows them, and communicates them to us, but we do not understand
them. Examples are Iliad 1.4031"., where the gods' name for the giant with
hundred arms is Briareos, while its human name is Aegaeon; and Iliad 20.74
where a river is called Xanthos "blond" by the gods and S kamander by men.
Hesiod also used "eponym(ous)" for significant names (e.g. in Theogony
28off. in the explanations of the names Pegasus and Chrysaor), andbothpoets
introduce etymologies with the phrase "eponymous (significant) because..."
(eponumon houneka):
"And they were surnamed 'Cyclopes' (Orb-eyed) because one orbed eye was set in their
foreheads'' (Kuklöpesd'onom' esan eponumon, hounek' am spheön/kukloteres ophthal-
mös heeis enekeito metopöi, Hesiod Theogony I44f., tr. Evelyn-White; cf. Homer Iliad
9·562).
Later, the "eponyms" were to be adoptedby grammatical theory äs a special
class of nouns. The Tekhne grammatike ascribed to Dionysius Thrax (2nd
Century BCE) defines it äs follows:
"An eponym, also called dionym ("double name") is a name that is applied to one
subject together with another proper name, äs e.g. Poseidon is also called "Eno-
sikhthön" ("Earth-shaker") and Apollo "Phoebus" ("theshiningone")" (Eponumon
da estin, ho km diönumon kaleüai, tö meth' heterou kuriou kath' henos legomenon, hos
Enosikhthön ho Poseidon km Phoibos ho Apollön, 38.3).
By that time, eponyms were 'nicknames', or name-epithets, with an obvious
meaning that related to the nature of the person (god) named. The prefix ep-
was apparently taken to mean 'extra'; a name that is 'added to' the regulär
one. In its earliest usage, where eponumon "eponym" serves to modify ono-
ma "name", the term itself is not very perspicuous. It seems to bear over-
tones of "being related to (a quality)", or of "to the point", "fitting".
Our first attestation of the word etetumös "truthfully, in accordance with
truth" (cf. etymo-logy), to indicate the 'appropriateness' of a name is in the
Agamemnon, a tragedy by Aeschylus (525/4-456 BCE); there, it is asked
about Heien:
"Who gave her so very true a name?" (tis pot' önomazen hod' es tö pän etetumösl,
Aeschylus Agamemnon 68if.).
Heien's name was found fitting, because it was associated with the root hel-
(cf. haireo) "to destroy": Heien destroyed ships and men; she was helenaus,
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"ship-destroying". As a synonym for etetumös "truthfully", "fittingly"
prepontös is used in verse 687. There are many more examples from tragedy
of significant names (e.g. Ajax, associated with "crying aiai, wailing"
(aiazein, Sophocles Ajax 430ff.; cf. Pentheus—penthos "grief, sorrow",
Eteocles "truly famous", Polyneikes "of many quarreis").
The word "etymology" (or at least the corresponding adjective) appears
to have been coined by the Stoic philosopher Chrysippus (3rd Century BCE)
(two works On Etymology are listed in his bibliography, Diogenes Laertius
7.200), but the practice it denotes was ubiquitous in Greek literature, both
before and after him. The word is strikingly absent from Plato's Cratylus.
Leclerc (1993) suggests that the great concentration of etymologies in the
earlier part of Hesiod's Theogony is meant to be an Illustration of the ease
with which man could grasp reality in the time before they were separated
from the Company of the gods, by Prometheus' treacherous division of the
first sacrificial victim. This would reflect the belief in the Status of names äs
a source of power or danger. The dangerous side may be illustrated by the
reluctance to use the names of dangerous gods, which were preferably re-
placed with euphemistic ones:
"I hesitate to call the 'Benevolent Goddesses' by name" ... "I know the goddesses you
meant. I do not want to name them" (onomazein gär aidoümai theäs eumenidas;
oid' häs elexas. onomasai d'ou boulomai, Euripides Orestes 37f.; 409).
Eumenids, "Benevolent Ones", is the euphemistic name for the Furies, the
divine revengers, a name best avoided lest those formidable powers be
aroused by it (cf. Van der Horst I994:3ff.).
As there was a link between eponymy and etymology, so is there between
euphemism and etymology. In fact, euphemism is a very reasonable explana-
tion for a phenomenon that has been an endless subject of derision, the
ancient etymologizing technique that derives a word from the opposite of its
meaning, with the famous example
lucus a non lucendo "a sacred wood (lucus) is called after the fact that there is no light
there (non lucendo) (Quintilianus 1.6.34; Augustinus De dialectica 6; De doctrina
christiana 111,29.41; Martianus Capella iv,36o; Herbermann 1991:364, n. 45).
The awe-inspiring nature of the power named made people look for an
inoffensive way of indicating what they meant without inadvertently activat-
ing its anger by using its real name.
Again, later grammatical terminology preserves a remainder of the belief
in the power of names. Jocelyn (1979:136, n. 218) discusses the term for a
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name or noun used in its proper sense, kurion (in the combination onoma
kuriori), first attested in this technical usage in Aristotle (e.g. Rhetoric
111,2.1405 ,^ Poetics 21.14570; 22.i458ai9 etc.). The casual way in which
Aristotle uses it, makes it likely that he did not coin it (äs do the implications
of the word). Kurios means "having power or authority over"; when applied
to inanimate things, it indicates something with special power or effect. What
then about kuria onomata "proper (valid) names'"?
"Such names were thought of äs ownmg the thmgs they sigmfied, hke occupiers with
a title to their lands and raovable goods, and possessmg the rehabihty associated in the
ancient world with ownership Horace' s verbum dommans [Ars Poetica 234] expressed
the concept exactly The regulär Latin term, however, verbum proprium .. put the
relationship the other way about with the thmg sigmfied ownmg the word (cf the Greek
onomata oikeia tön pragmatön ["the proper names of the thmgs"] ([Aristotle]
Rhetonca ad Alexandrum I438a34f " (Jocelyn 1979 136, n 218)
This section started with some early ideas underlying etymology. In origin
it was without any doubt a phenomenon that belonged in folk-linguistics, but
it also played a role in later exchanges between intellectuals, notably philoso-
phers and philologists. As one of the six tasks of grammar (see e.g. the
opening section of Dionysius Thrax Tekhne grammatike), it was helpful to
establish the meaning and orthography of obscure poetic words, but it never
turned into a mainstream activity of grammar with its own theory. Rather,
it was pari of the general intellectual paradigm, alegitimate way to underpin
an argument, or to illustrate a point. Basically every change in the form of
a word would be acceptable, äs long äs there remained a vague similarity
between the word in question and the names or sentences adduced to explain
it. A felicitous link on the semantic level was all-important.
Apart from the many instances of etymology in ancient literature at large,
and especially in works of a linguistic nature, our three main sources for
ancient etymology are Plato (427-347 BCE) in his Cratylus, Varro (i 16-27
BCE) in his De lingua Latina "On the Latin Language" and Augustine's
(354-430 CE) De dialectica. It is striking how little change or development
in the actual techniques can be found between the three of them.
Herbermann (1991) rightly Stresses the fact that in antiquity etymology
was never motivated by historical interests. Its purpose was primarily better
to understand the reasons for giving a concept its name, and therefore, to
motivate a meaning which the concept supposedly was carrying all the while.
A preconceived notion of what the meaning actually is, usually underlies the
proposed etymology:
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"Es handelt sich um die Frage nach dem Grund der Benennungsbeziehung eines
bestimmten lexikalischen Ausdrucks zu einem bestimmten Inhalt oder Gegenstand, und
die Begründung dieser Beziehung durch bestimmte Arten der Bezugnahme auf andere
Ausdrucke derselben Sprache sowie deren Inhalt bzw Denotata" (Herbermann
1991:366)
In this sense etymology is never used ίο find the meaning of a word (unless
perhaps where a philologist tries to establish the meaning of a now obscure
poeticism), but only to corroborate it. Meaning is supposed to be the constant
factor, no matter what happens to the word-form. This principle was first
expounded by Socrates in Plato's Cratylus (393dif.; 394b2ff.; see below,
Section 6), and it was to guide ancient etymological practice throughout. It
fitted in especially well with the principles of the Stoics who held that only
a word-form could act or be acted upon (because it is a 'body', namely
battered air), while meaning is something incorporeal, which therefore re-
mains unaffected (see Section 8). The grammarian Trypho (i st Century BCE)
idiosyncratically held the view that meaning could actually influence the form
of a word, and vice versa (äs in hemikuklion "half circle", where the first
part of the compound, hemi-, is itself half of the word for "half", hemisu-).
Usually, however, etymology's basic contribution is to a synchronic under-
standing of language, and through language, of the world.
The absence of a historical interest also explains why it was possible to
give several etymologies for one name, äs when, for example, Socrates gives
four different explanation of the name Apollo, based on the four areas in
which the activities ofthat god were thought to reside: he is the god of med-
icine and ritual purification, and his name duly reflects that he is "cleansing
and redeeming from evil" apolouön te kai apoluön ton ... kakon, Cratylus
4O5b. He is the god of divination and in that capacity deals in truth and sim-
plicity (to alethes te kal to haploün), which yields the name Haploun, and
hence, Apollo (405c). He is also the god of archery and always hits his tar-
get. Thus, his name isAeiballön, "ever-darting", and hence, Apollo. And,
finally, he is the god of music, astronomy and harmony: this means that he
makes things "move together", either the poles of heaven (polous), or in
musical harmony. As "together" is homoü or a, Apollo is "he who causes
to move together", Homopolon (405C). The extra lambda is inserted in order
to avoid associations with "to destroy utterly" (apol-lapöl-\ unfortunately
the present Infinitive of the same verb does have two lambda's (apollunai)).
The removal of this unwanted association—which detracts from the essence
of the god—is the ethical motivation behind the whole Operation (4056).
All four derivations of the name are obviously meant to be true simulta-
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neously. They are not mutually exclusive, but complementary. Together they
present the füll ränge of meanings that Apollo had in Greek society. These
meanings are not learned from the name, but the name functions äs a kind
of repository or archive from which they may be retrieved: although it would
be rash to lump Plato together with representatives of an archaic cosmology,
I submit that he has preserved a trace here of how etymology could be used
äs a strategy to understand the present better.
Both the useof etymologies and the possibilityofcombinationsofsimulta-
neously valid etymologies proved to be very long-lived. For example, when
Theophilus, a Christian from the 2nd Century CE, explains the 'names' or
titles of God, he gives a double derivation for the word God (theos) itself:
"He is called God (theos) because he bases (tetheikenai) the world on his own stability,
and because he runs (theein) and runmng is racmg, moving, being active, nourishmg,
taking care, govermng, and making everythmg alive" (theos de legetai diä to tetheikenai
täpanta epi teiheautoü asphaleiai, kal diä to theein to de theein estln to trekhein, kal
kinem, kal energem, kal trephein, kalpronoem, kal kubernän, kaizöopoiem täpanta,
Theophilus Agamst Autolycus 1,4)
The second of these etymologies is taken straight from the Cratylus (397d).
For the connection with the verb tithenai, see Herodotus Histories 2.52, who
connects "gods" (iheous) with "setting in order" (kosmöi thentes).
Obviously, etymology also lends itself to comical distortions, and the
comedian Aristophanes (5th Century BCE) was quick to avail himself of the
opportunity: thunder is no more than a heavenly fart, äs is obvious from the
names:
"That is why their names are similar, too, bronlt (thunder) andporde (fart)" (taut' ara
kat tönomat' allelom, bronte kal porde, homoiö, Aristophanes Clouds 394)
This takes us back to folk-linguistics (i.e. punning), but the difference with
'serious' etymologies lies in the intention of the author only. Even Plato, who
gives a sharp critique of the value of etymology in the Cratylus makes use
of the possibilities of assonance to suggest meaningful links between words
like: anoetous/amuetous "stupid"/"notinitiated(intheMysteries)" (Phaedo
8od); Haidou/aides "Hades' place (the underworld)"/ "invisible" (Phaedo
81 c-d, in spite of Cratylus 4033; 4O4ab); soma/sema "body "/ "tomb" (Gor-
gias 493aiff., the connection goes back to Orphic doctrine, cf. Cratylus
40ob/c) andptihos/pithanos "jar/impressionable (Gorgias 493a6, explaining
that someone gave the name "jar" to the part of the soul that contains the
appetites "äs being so impressionable and persuadable" (diä topithanon te
kal peistikon, tr. Lamb).
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The ancient authors most consistently resisting the indiscriminate use of
etymology are Aristotle (384-322 BCE) and Galen (2nd Century CE). The
former only accords it the value of an auctoritas argument, because an ety-
mology represents the 'true' view of reality of the earliest Greeks (cf. e.g.
Aristotle On the Soul i .2 405b26ff.). Galen equally rejects the epistemologi-
cal value of etymology and its use äs a heuristic device (in his On the Views
ofPlato and Hippocrates, see DeLacy 1966).
In this section, etymology turned out to be a common strategy by which
especially an oral society tries to get a sense of control over the world. As
such it was connected with mythology and genealogy. Names were held to
convey Information about the essence of a thing, the sort of Information you
would not want to give an enemy access to. Ancient etymology appears in
the context of folk-linguistics, but is also a constant factor in intellectual
discourse. Multiple explanations of a name can be simultaneously valid and
collaborate to give a complete picture of the concept named. The supposed
changes in the word-forms are not ruled by any firm laws, except for the fact
that the semantic value of the word, through all its changes, must be constant.
4. Pre-Alexandrian exegesis (6th-4th centuries BCE)
Manetti (l 987) locates the origins of ancient semiotics in divination, medicine
(prognosis), and writing. Trying to find out the will of the gods, the Greeks,
like the people fromMesopotamia, 'read' the signs, verbal and otherwise that
were thought to stem from divine powers. The gap dividing men from gods
implied that the signs were bound to be obscure and in need of Interpretation
(Manetti I987:27ff.). In this context, we will focus on the exegesis of the
linguistic sign. In fact, the earliest attestations of the very words exegesis
"explanation, Interpretation" and its corresponding verb exegeomai "to
expound, Interpret" point towards these same areas. Functionaries called
exegetai "Interpreters" stood guard over Attic sacred rites and customs that
were orally transmitted. These Attic Interpreters put down their 'interpreta-
tions' in writing from the 4th Century BCE onwards. Exegetes is used in
Herodotus of Interpreters of Oracles, dreams and omens (e.g. Histories i .78).
In Histories 2.49 he states that it was Melampous "who {introduced and
explained} (exegesamenos) the name, sacrifice and phallic procession of
Dionysus" (Melampous esti ho exegesamenos toü Dionusou to te ounoma
kal ten thusien käi ten pompen toü phalloü). Exegeisthai means that he
introduced them to these new rites and taught them how to use them, but it
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also seems to carry overtones of explanation, especially when compared to
the Histories 2.50 on the Egyptian origin of the Greek names of the gods (cf.
also 4.36.2). Exegesis of Homer is expressed by the verb exegetsthai "to
Interpret", e.g. Plato Cratylus4073; Ion 531 a. Another area whereexegesis
came to be practised was philosophy: Zeno of Elea (fl. 464/1 BCE) allegedly
wrote an Exegesis ton Empedokleous "Exegesis of the works of
Empedocles", andHeracleidesPonticus (ca. 390-3 iOBCE)wrotefourbooks
of Herakleüou exegeseis "interpretations of Heraclitus".
Manetti (i987:53ff.) illustrates the rhetorical or dialectical process
through which the results of oracular consultation was translated into a con-
crete policy for the polis with the well-known example of the oracle on the
'wooden walls' fromHerodotus. But this passage (Histories j.I4off.) is also
revealing for its exegetical techniques and the quite sophisticated, if implicit,
ideas on 'meaning'. Moreover, it shows how exegetical techniques were
made subordinate to an ulterior (in this case political) goal.
Faced with the threat of a massive Persian attack (480 BCE), the Athenians
dispatched envoys to the oracle at Delphi. The answer (which they had taken
down in writing, sungrapsamenoi 7.142) seemed to leave very little hope:
the only glimmer of light offered by the oracle was the protection to be
offered by "a wood-built wall". The oracle ended with the verses:
"Salamis, isle divine! 'tis writ that children of women
Thou shalt destroy one day, in the season of seed-time or harvest" (o theie Salamis,
apoleis de sü tekna gunaikon/e pou skidnamenes Demeteros e suniouses, Histories
7.141, tr. Godley).
Back in Athens the oracle is discussed in the Assembly. A group of eiders
suggested the oracle was referring to the Acropolis, which had originally been
fenced in by a thorn hedge (the "wood-built wall"): they proposed to give
Athens up to the enemy and to withdraw on the Acropolis. A second group
thought the "wood-built wall" signified (semainein, 7.142) a naval force of
wooden ships. But this group was confounded by the last two verses which
seemed to announce a terrible defeat in a sea-battle near the little Island of
Salamis.
From a semantic point of view, it is striking that no one opts for a literal
Interpretation. The literal meaning of "a wood-built wall" is clear. What is
disputed is the Intention of the oracle. The exegesis of the eiders requires a
kind of synecdoche: the wood-built wall that once upon a time fenced in the
Acropolis now Stands for the Acropolis äs a whole. The other party takes the
words metaphorically: a "wood-built wall" refers to a protective device
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made of wood. Both parties are aware of the fact that what one says and what
one means do not stand in a one-to-one correspondence.
At this point of bis story Herodotus first introduces the great Athenian
statesman Themistocles. As becomes evident later (7.144), Themistocles had
advocated the building of a fleet before, and he had suggested that the Athe-
nians use the silver from the mines of Laurium for this purpose. So, clearly,
Themistocles is committed to defending the second 'reading' of the oracle:
this means he must off er an Interpretation of the last two verses that removes
the threat of a naval defeat for the Athenians. Themistocles realizes that the
oracle is ambiguous: "children of women" can refer to the Persians äs well
äs to the Greeks. Ambiguity is a regulär characteristic of oracles and one of
the reasons why they are always right. We may compare the oracle given to
Croesus (purporting that a great empire would fall if he attacked. He duly
attacked, not realizing that bis own empire was meant (Histories ι .54)). The-
mistocles exploits this ambiguity and points out that the qualification "di-
vine" for the isle of Salamis sits oddly with a defeat of the Greeks. In that
case, the oracle would surely have called Salamis "wretched". Therefore,
says Themistocles, the "children of women" are the Persians, not the Greeks;
the Greeks will be victorious in the naval battle, and the "wood-built wall"
means the fleet.
It is clear that Themistocles Starts bis Interpretation from a preconceived
notion of what is to be the most fruitful policy for the Athenians. His exegesis
serves a rhetorical (persuasive) and political end, and indeed, it betrays a
considerable degree of sophistication. Although this is not made explicit,
Themistocles requires consistency in the emotional impact of the two halves
of the problematic verse: you cannot say in one breath: "Divine Salamis, you
will destroy us", which is what the alternative Interpretation of the words
"children of women" would boil down to. "Children of women" is ambigu-
ous, "divine" is not (or so Themistocles claims); therefore, "divine" must
be the starting-point of the Interpretation and "children of women" must be
explained accordingly. The possibility that the oracle might be pro-Persian
or neutral is not taken into consideration. The former would enable it to call
the Island "divine" while still alluding to the defeat of the Athenians, the
latter to call the island "divine" irrespective of what happens in its environ-
ment. All that matters in this context is that the apparent threat of the oracle
is dissolved, and that is where the Interpretation will stop. Exegesis is not
practised for its own sake.
Not only in interpreting the will of the gods, whether expressed in dreams
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or in oracles, did the Greeks need exegesis. The original function of the poets
in an oral society, to be the preservers of the tribal past and the living expla-
nation of the Status quo, was not over and done with when Greece gradually
evolved into a (more) literate society (from the JÜ\ Century BCE onwards).
The poets remained all-important äs the educators of youth, and the teachers
of society at large. Their work was not only disseminated through perfor-
mance, it also constituted an important part of the school curriculum. But
since the chronological gap between their language and social background
and that of their students was continually widening, an effort of Interpretation
was necessary in order to make their work accessible and to maintain its
relevance to the new historical circumstances. In the period before the foun-
dation of the Museum in Alexandria (6th-4th centuries BCE), three exegetical
techniques are especially relevant to our present theme of semantics: glosses,
paraphrase, and allegory.
Glosses are "difficult words" from Homer, for which Attic equivalents
had to be found. Real "glossography" emerged only in the 3rd Century, but
on a less institutionalized basis the practice was much older. The rhapsodes,
who performed Homer's poetry, were also supposed to be able to explain his
words. Democritus (5th Century BCE) wrote about glosses in Homer, and
Aristotle (4th Century BCE) uses the term äs a matter of course.
An example of paraphrastic technique is Plato's Republic (n,392cff.); in
this text Socrates remedies the baneful influence of direct speech in poetry,
which forces the reader completely to identify with the emotions of a charac-
ter. Socrates' solution is to report such speech in a prose paraphrase. The
paraphrastic technique is likely to reflect a familiär school practice.
In view of the authority attributed to the poets, it was important to have
them on your side in any argument. This means that exegesis was often used
with ulterior motives, to support a certain view. Plato again offers an example
in his Protagoras, where Socrates' paraphrase of a poem by Simonides turns
that poet into a Socratic avant la lettre. Clearly, the exegesis has a rhetorical
(or dialectical) function, but at the same time it exhibits considerable philo-
logical sophistication (e.g., Socrates uses different antonyms to the same
terms to bring about a shift in the argument). Plato does not leave it at this,
however. His Socrates rejects the Interpretation of poems äs a legitimate way
of conducting a discussion. The poets cannot be questioned nor can they
answer back. This means that there is an element of arbitrariness in asserting
that the poet means or intends (noein) this or the other (3476); it can never
be proven or disproved. In other words: using the poets is incompatible with
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dialectics. The same rejection of the authority of the poets can be seen in the
Ion and in the so-called aporetic dialogues, where the interlocutors look for
definitions of moral values. One of the definitions proposed in the course of
the discussion (only to be rejected äs unsatisfactory) always stems from a
poet. It is typical of Plato to take up such generally accepted discussion
techniques (using the poets, using language and etymology) only to disraiss
them äs improper tools for a dialectician: epistemologically, they are of
strictly limited value. I will return to this matter in Section 6, on the Cratylus.
Finding support for one's view in the poets, especially in Homer and
Hesiod, sometimes required a huge interpretive effort. When the surface
meaning of the text failed to produce the required testimony, its true meaning
was searched for below the surface. In a sense, the poetic text took on the
characteristics of an oracle. The deeper sense, or huponoia, "under-sense",
is hidden (like the true meaning of an oracle) and should be retrieved from
the text by reading it allegorically. Allegory was often backed up by etymol-
ogy (Buffiere I956:6off.). Plato already knew of (possibly quite extensive)
allegorical readings of Homer. He was prepared to admit that Homer's
message might be relevant and respectable on such an Interpretation, but he
feit one could not leave it to children to gather such hidden boons from the
text, and therefore he rejected the poets äs educators of the Greek (Republic
H,378 d).
The first allegorical interpretations of Homer took the gods äs allegories
for physical phenomena, reading the lliad äs a kind of cosmogony (Theagenes
of Rhegium, 6th Century BCE). They were positive in character, trying to turn
Homer into a very early witness for cosmological and phüosophical insights
that were made explicit only later on (e.g. by the originators of the allegorical
Interpretation themselves). But there was also an apologetic stream of allegor-
ical Interpretation, that tried to explain away offensive bits of Homer (like
the gods' adulteries, or lies), often by invoking ethical allegories (in which
e.g. the gods represent virtues). This was a reaction to the criticism of philos-
ophers like Xenophanes (6th Century BCE) directed at Homer' s representation
of the gods. Ethical and physical allegory were to remain the major species
of this type of Interpretation, the former practiced mainly by rhetoricians, the
latter by philosophers and theologians. The Stoa was to become especially
famous (or notorious) for it.
Huponoia "under-sense" was the earliest term for allegory. The word
allegoria "to say other (than that which is meant)" is of later date. It stems
from a grammatical/rhetorical context, i.e. a context that is primarily didactic
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and prescriptive: allegoreö "to say other (than that which is meant)", is what
the producer of a text does; only secondarily can it refer to a method of
readingorexplainingatext(seeWhitman 1987:263-68; Buffierei956:45ff.).
The term huponoia is neutral where the Opposition intended/unintentional
deeper meaning is concerned.
Allegory is not the only rhetorical trope in which what is said and what
is meant do not coincide: the same goes for tropes like metaphor and irony.
Allegorical Interpretation became especially important in Jewish and Chris-
tian exegesis of the Bible and in the Neoplatonists.
5. The inteilectuals' debate in the 6th and 5th centuries BCE:
On language, truth, knowledge and reality
The inteilectuals of the 6th and 5th centuries BCE regarded Homer and Hesiod
äs the first Greekinteilectuals, and they regarded themselves äs (critical) heirs
to the poetic tradition. Philosophers, poets, doctors, sophists and politicians
(groups often difficult to distinguish, because most of the individuals in-
volved belong to more than one category) took up position against their
predecessors in the polemical and antagonistic way characteristic of intellec-
tual discourse of the period. Hence, interestingly, the poets' outlook came
to some extent to determine the questions that were discussed. The poetic
interest in language, in the trustworthiness of names, and the implicit observa-
tions made in that connection became part of the general scholarly 'data-
base', a common body of knowledge, to be dealt with by every self-respecting
scholar. This helps to explain why even in the context of early lonian 'natural
philosophy' questions pertaining to the nature of language were inevitably
taken up. Although their interest was not primarily linguistic, scholars were
concerned with the relationship between language, truth, knowledge and
reality, in the footsteps of the poets.
The issue that lay at the heart of scholarly interests in this period was the
nature of our world: how did it originate and what were its principles, its
ultimate constituents? Another question concerned the value of our sense-
perceptions: is the world in a state of eternal flux, or, quite to the contrary,
is change just an illusion? Widely diverging opinions on each of these issues
were aired, in a process of continuous reevaluation and reinterpretation of
the 'common data-base' mentioned above, and it is in this context that the
contribution of language to our state of knowledge was being weighed.
However, this does not mean that the philosophers involved engaged in a
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proper 'philosophy of language'. Their goals lay elsewhere.
Heraclitus (fl. ca. 500 BCE)"thedarkphilosopher" (ho skoteinos) emphat-
ically takes up position against the poets: in his view the world is based on
a Substrate of fire, which is involved in a continuous process of change (or
strife, äs he prefers to call it). Strife between opposites creates the temporanly
harmonious states that we think we observe. Over and beyond matter (fire)
and the change processes there is the Logos, or Reason, which governs our
cosmos. In view of this cosmology, Homer was completely misguided when
he wished away strife from between gods and men (Iliad 18.107; Heraclitus
Fragment A 22). And because opposites are essentially one, Hesiod was
equally wrong when he called "Day" a child of "Night" (Fragment B 57).
The same polemical tone is clear from Fragment B 40, for example:
"Much learmng does not teach one to have mtelligence, for it would have taught Hesiod
and Pythagoras, and agam, Xenophanes and Hecataeus" (polumathie noon ekhem ou
didaskei Hesiodon gär an edidaxe kai Puthagoren autis te Xenophanea te kai
Hekatawn, tr Freeman, cf. Fr B 42)
Now, since everything essentially consists of opposites, names are always
insufficient äs a medium to convey essences. They never capture more than
one half of the essential duality. On the other hand, they are not absolutely
useless either, for they do contain relevant Information about that one half
of the concept. This is clear from fragments like the following:
"That which alone is wise is one, it is unwilling and willmg to be called by the name
of Zeus" (hen to sophön moünon legesthai ouk ethelei kai ethelei Zends onoma, Frag-
ment 32, tr. Freeman).
Zeus' name is feit to indicate "living" (zeri); thus, it leaves out one half of
an essential unity, but the half that is represented is meaningful. The divine
unity of oppositions and the ensuing arbitrariness of names also comes out
in Fragment 67:
"God is day-mght, wmter-summer, war-peace, satiety-farriine But he changes like (fire,
or. oil1?) which when it mmgles with the smoke of mcense, is named accordmg to each
man's pleasure" (ho theös hemere euphrone, kheimön theros, polemos eir&ne, koros
hmos, alloioütai de hokösper <pür; elawn (Barnes)> hopotan summigei thuömasm,
onomazetai kath' hedonen hekastou, tr Freeman)
In this fragment Heraclitus first refers to the essential unity of opposites (god
is day-night), and then to the process of continuous change (alloioütai),
comparing god to fire (or oil); if it is correct to give a linear Interpretation
of the aphorism, naming belongs to the stage of perpetual change and cap-
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tures one element of it in accordance with individual preferences. To a certain
extent, names are therefore both arbitrary and conventional. The incomplete
reliability of names seems to be at the heart of Fragment 48 äs well:
"The bow [bios] is called Life [bfos], but its work is death" (ίδϊοΰη toxöi onoma bios,
ergon de thanatos; tr. Freeman).
The Opposition between name and "work" is common. See e.g. the Hippo-
cratic On Nutriment 21.
Heraclitus' gambit of a world in flux was countered by Parmenides of Elea
(515-after 450 BCE), who wrote apoemin hexameters (putting himself firmly
in the tradition of Homer, Hesiod and oracular utterances, but also of
Xenophanes who had used the same medium to contest their authority). After
a prologue describing how goddesses set him on the road to knowledge, a
Way of Truth, and a Way of Opinion are described. It is Parmenides' main
object to penetrate the concepts of Truth and Opinion. The Way of Truth
teaches him that the cosmos is eternal, unmoved and true, whereas the world
of Coming-to-be is not true: in fact it is the world of "it is not". Perception
does not lead to truth. Parmenides Starts from the only basic truths, namely
the predicate that "It is" (esti) and the corresponding noun (or substantivized
participle) "what is" (eori). In the realm of Truth, there is a complete identity
between being, thought and Speech, but it is restricted to the only possible
true Statement that "What is, is" (e.g. Fragments B 3; 6; 7; 8.34; cf. Di
Cesare 1991:941".). "What is not" cannot be named and cannot be thought
(anoeton anonumon, Fragment 8.17). 'Names', other than esti and eon do
not belong to the sphere of Truth, but are just that: mere names that form the
subjects or predicates of deceptive Statements that do not reflect reality, but
human belief s:
"Therefore, all things will be (just) a name which mortals, believing that they are real,
suppose to be coming to be and perishing, to be and not to be, to change position, and
to alter their colour from dark to bright and vice versa'' (töipant' onom(a) estai,/hossa
brotol katethento pepoithotes emai alethe,/gignesthai te kal ollusthai, βϊηαί te kai
oukhi,/km topon aliassein dia te khroaphanon ameibein, Fragment 8.37ff.; tr. Coxon,
adapted).
This is also emphasized in the transitional part of the poem, where we go
from the Way of Truth onto that of Opinion:
"At this point I cease my reliable theory and thought, concerning Truth; from here
onwards you must learn the opinions of mortals, listening to the deceptive order of my
words. They have established [the custom of] naming two forms, one of which ought
not to be [mentioned]: that is where they have gone astray. They have distinguished
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them äs opposite in form, and have marked them off from another by giving them
different signs [Light/Night] ... But since all things are named Light and Night ..."
(en toi soi pauö piston logon ede noema/amphis aletheies: doxas d'apö toüde
broteias/manthane kosmon emon epeön apatelon akouön./^ß morphäs gär katethento
duo gnömas onomazein:/ton mian ou khreon estin—en höipeplanemenoi eisin -/antia
d'ekrinanto demas kal semat' ethento/khörls ap'allelön [phaos/ηύχ], Fragment B
8,soff.;... autär epeidepantaphaos kai nüxonomastai..., Fragment R 9; tr. Freeman).
In the realm of Opinion, names are essentially unreliable. People think they
can distinguish opposites. They give them separate names and when making
a Statement about them, they can use only one to the exclusion of the other,
which at that time 'is not': but äs we have seen, that means they tread outside
the realm of Truth. The arbitrary process of naming causes fragmentation of
'what is' (cf. Di Cesare 1980:30). This seems to be the meaning of this diffi-
cult fragment. What is clear in any case, is that mortals err in assigning and/or
applying names; names are Instruments of Opinion (doxa) (Fragment^ 19).
They belong in the domain of Opinion and are conventional. By making bis
distinction of the role and reliability of names in the Ways of Truth and
Opinion, Parmenides reacts to Heraclitus both where the principles of change
or immutability are concerned, and in the question of the relation of names
to truth, reality and knowledge.
A similar view of the difference between reality and the makeshift names
people use to describe their view of reality can be found in Empedocles (493-
433 BCE): he thinks the world consists of the four elements, earth, water, air
and fire, which are continually mixing or separating in two opposed processes
directedby "Love" and "Steife":
"And I shall teil you another thing: there is no creation of substance (phusis) in any one
of mortal existences, nor any end in execrable death, but only mixing and exchange
of what hasbeenmixed; and the name 'substance' (phusis, "nature" )isappliedto them
by mankind" (allo de toi ereö: phusis oudenös estin hapantön/thneton, ou.de tis
oulomenou thanatoio teleutS,/alla monon mixis te diallaxis te migentön/esti, phusis d'ept
tois onomazetai anthropoisin, Fragment B 8, tr. Freeman).
"Nature" "coming to being" (phusis) does not correspond to an ontological
reality, it is just a name. The conventional nature of names is taken up again
in Fragment 9: If a certain phenomenon takes place
"then (they) say that this has 'come into being' ... The terms that Right demands they
do notuse; butthrough custom Imy seif also apply these names" (tote men to <legousi>
genesthai ...he themis <ou> kaleousi, nomöi d'epiphemi kal autos, Fragment B 9; tr.
Freeman).
Names are not in accordance with the factual state of affairs, but Empedocles
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is not going to quibble over them: he adapts to custom (nomos) (cf.
Heinimann I945:84ff.; Schmitter 1991:76). Insteadoftryingtogetridof the
word "coming-to-be" (genesis), he gives it its customary due (Fragment B
10, apodoünai tois onomasi to nenomismenori). This idea is widespread
among the intellectuals of the era. Exactly the same view, namely that
coming-into-being and passing away are no more than the customary names
for mixing and separating, is to be found in Hippocrates' On Regimen 1.4.
He, too, is prepared to accommodate "hoi polloi". Anaxagoras also points
out the faultiness of this usage on the same grounds (Fragment B 17 "the
Greeks have an incorrect belief (or: an incorrect usage) about Corning into
Being and Passing Away" (to de ginesthai kai apollusthai ouk orthos
nomizousin hoi Hellenes, tr. Freeman; notice that nomizein is ambiguous
between "to hold a belief ", and "to have a custom(ary usage)"). Herodotus
extends the same tolerance to mistaken usage in his description of the coast
of Asia:
"It ends, not really but äs the word goes (nomöi) in the Arab Gulf" (leget de haute, ou
lögousa ei nie nomöi, es ton kolpon tönArabion, Histories 4.39, cf. Heinimann 1945:82).
According to Empedocles, language is a reflection of man's (wrong)
opinions about the world, but it is useless to oppose it. Empedocles here
anticipates one of the theories of meaning put forward in Plato's Cratylus,
namely that words reflect a certain perspective on the world (see Section 6).
A similar slight depreciation of language on account of its conventional
nature can be found in Socrates' contemporary, Democritus (ca. 460-360),
who otherwise shows a vivid interest in linguistic (literary) questions (see
Diogenes Laertius 9.37 for a list of his works). In his view there are but two
realities, atoms and the void. These are "by nature" (phusei), everything eise
is a matter of convention, or conventional linguistic usage (cf. Heinimann
1945:87^). This can be illustrated by the fact that he uses a number of dif-
ferent terms to indicate what he sees äs the ultimate goal of mankind, namely
"contentment" (euthumia) (Diogenes Laertius 9.45). In Proclus' commentary
on Plato's Cratylus, Democritus is made out to be a champion of the
conventionalist thesis that the relation between names and things is arbitrary
on the strength of four arguments, all of them reflecting a deficient one-to-one
correspondence between language and reality:
"Democritus says names are by convention and he confirms this by four dialectical
proofs: (i) from homonymy: different things are called by the same name; therefore
names are not by nature; (2) and from multiplicity of names: if different names will fit
one and the same thing, they will also fit each other, which is impossible; (3) from the
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change of names for why have we changed Anstocles mto Plato, and Tyrtamus into
Theophrastus, if names are by nature ^  (4) and by the deficiency of similar items why
do we say 'to be wise' (phmnem) frorn 'wisdom' (phronesis), but is there no such
denvation fromjustice (dikawsune)^ Therefore, names are by comciaence and not by
nature .. (7-3ff.) and he calis the first proof 'polyseme' (polusemori), the second
'equality' (isorrhopon}, the third 'metonym' (metonumon), the fouith 'nameless' (nonu-
mon)" (Ho de Demokritos thesei legön tä onomata dm tessarön epikhetrematön toüto
kateskeuazen · ek tes homönumias tä gär diaphora pragmata toi autöi kaloüntai
onomati, ouk araphusei to onoma; kal ek tespoluönumias · eigär tä diaphora onomata
epl to auto kal henprägma epharmosousm, kal epallela, hoper adunaton; triton ek tes
tön onomatön metatheseös' dtä ti gär ton Aristoklea men Platöna, tön de Turtamon
Theophraston metönomasamen, ei phusei tä onomata ? ek de tes ton homoiön elleipseös;
diä ti apö men lis phronSseos legomen phmnem, apö de tes dikaiosunes ouketi
paronomazomen7 tukhei ara kal ouphusei tä onomata. (7 3ff.)· kalei de ho autös to
men proton epikheirema polusemon, to de deuteron isorrhopon, <tö de triton metö-
numon>, tö de tetarton nönumon, Proclus in Pl. Crat. p 6 20ff. Pasquah (= Fragment
A 26))
It is unclear how much in this fragment is actually Democritean, apart from
the bare fact of a distinction of the different types of failing one-to-one
correspondence between names and things. In spite of his view of language
äs a conventional System, Democritus still uses etymologies. Like Empe-
docles, he knows that what the etymologies will reflect is not so much a
reliable picture of the world äs it is, but rather convention itself, and hence,
the views that go with it. Accordingly, he derives "woman" (gune), from
"seed" (gone), because that is what she is receptive of (Fragment E I22a);
and the name Tritogeneia for Athena, representing wisdom, is explained
because three things originate from wisdom (ginetai... tria): good counsel,
flawless Speech and appropriate action (Fragment B 2). The context of his
saying "speech is the shadow of action" (logos ergou skiS, Fragment!} 145)
is lost. Maybe it simply refers to the common conception of the priority of
action over words, but the word "shadow" seems to imply more, viz. both
the derived nature of speech, and the fact that it is meaningful—even if only
in a secondaryorderivedsense. Compare Simonides' (6th Century BCE) view
that "speech is an image of the facts (so that a speech of what is useful, is
useful etc.)" (ho logos ton pragmatön eikon estin (hos emai ton men ton
öphelimön öphelimon ktl, Simonides apud Michael Psellus, De daemonum
energz'a(PatrologiaGraecaMigne I22,82i));(seealsolsocrates3.7,quoted
in Section 7).
Democritus' views on the Opposition between convention (nomos) and
nature (phusis) reflect the general interest of contemporary intellectuals in
the relationship between the two, especially in connection with the develop-
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ment of human culture. Around the middle of the fifth Century B c E , a number
of teachers of rhetoric traveled through the Greek world, offering lectures
and courses to young people who wanted to prepare themselves for active
citizenship in the polis. Because of their interest in the nature of human
culture, these sophists accorded the study of language a much greater empha-
sis than had the philosophers we have been discussing so far. The primary
interests of the latter group was in cosmology and epistemology. The sophists
on the other hand concentrated on language itself, not only because it was
the medium of their rhetoric, but also äs a part of human culture at large.
They considered the question whether language was a cultural acquisition,
and therefore a barrier between men and the ultimate truths, or a direct,
natural road of access to reality. Many, but not all of the sophists opted for
a relativist position, denying fixed ethical values, and stressing the arbitrari-
ness of all conventions, including those of human language.
How widely diffused these ideas were among intellectuals of the period
appears from the opening section of a treatise that was falsely attributed to
the famous physician Hippocrates, but was presumably written by a 5th-
century sophist. In trying to defend the Status of medicine äs a true art, the
author of The Art also comes to reflect on the Status of names:
"Now reality is known when the arts have been already revealed, and there is no art
which is not seen äs springing from some real essence. I for my part think that the arts
have also got their names because of the real essences; for it is absurd—nay impossi-
ble—to hold that real essences spring from names. For names are institutions, but real
essences are not institutions but the offspring of nature" (ginosketai toinun dedeigmenön
ede ton tekhneön, kai oudemiaestin, hegeektinoseideosoukhhorätai. oimaid'egöge
kai tä onomata autäs diä tä eidea labern: alogon gär apö ton onomatön hegeisthai tä
eidea blastanein km adunaton; tä men gär onomata [phusios] nomolhetemata estin,
tä de eidea ou nomothetemata allä blastemata [phuseös A, del. Diels, post blastemata
transposuit Gomperz], The Art 2; tr. Jones, adapted)
The author does not argue for a direct link between name and essence. On
the contrary, he claims that essences are primary. Every art is based on a real
essence. Only at a second stage have the arts received an (arbitrary) name;
the things named, however, do in this case reflect real divisions in reality.
Contrast eh. 6 of the same treatise, where the author denies that such a corre-
spondence with reality exists for the word "spontaneity" (to automatoh).
"Spontaneity" is therefore "nothing but a name" (oudemien all' eonoma).
The priority of the ontological, existential level can be found in another
pseudo-Hippocratic treatise, perhaps by Polybus (ca. 400 BCE), On the Nature
ofMan. In this work a humoral theory is expounded, in which bodily func-
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tions are seen äs largely dependent on an equilibrium between the four body
humours (blood, yellow bile, black bile and phlegm). Here, it is argued that
there are four different names for these humours, precisely because there are
four separate entities that correspond to these names in reality (On the Nature
ofMan 5, 6.40 Littre). The concept of naming äs a method to differentiate
elements of reality may equally lie behind Herodotus' intriguing remark—
untrue in its literal sense—about the origin of Greek religion: "The names
of almost all the gods came to Greece from Egypt" (skhedön de kaipantön
tä ounomata tön theon exAiguptou eleluthe es ten Hellada, Histories 2.50);
it also plays a role in the Derveni Papyrus, a commentary on an Orphic
cosmogony, and is taken up in Plato's Cratylus 388bi3ff., where names are
described äs tools to differentiate reality (see Section 6; cf. Burkert 1985;
Thomas forthcoming).
Protagoras (fl. 444 BCE), one of the proposed spiritual fathers of the treatise
The Art, claimed that any subject gave occasion to two opposite speeches and
he found a truly 'sophistic' method of confounding his opponents by ignoring
the sense (dianoiari) of words and arguing strictly from the words (pros
tounomd) (Fragment A i = Diogenes Laertius 9.52). That means that he was
convinced there was no naturally correct way of approaching reality with
words, or rather that he was not interested in reality at all. Whether something
is 'real' or 'the case' or not is immaterial to his method.
On the other band, he is also known äs the first to have explicitly formu-
lated a number of grammatical distinctions based on semantic considerations:
He distinguished the genders of the nouns, inspired by the biological differ-
ence between male, female and inanimate beings (skeue "Instruments",
"things") (Fragmente 27 = Aristotle, Ä/zeton'c 111,5.1407b6), and criticized
Homer for not applying the biological distinctions correctly in language.
Surely, words like wrath (rngnis) and axe (pelex) shouldbe masculine: there-
fore, when Homer sings of Achilles' "terrible wrath" äs menin... oulomenen
(the ending of oulomenen indicates that menin is feminine) in the first two
verses of the Iliad, he is committing a solecism, even if nobody had noticed
before (Fragment A 28 = Aristotle On Sophistical Refutations 14.173^7).
He also distinguished four types of discourse, prayer, question, answer and
order, which he called "foundations of Speech" (puthmenas... logön,Frag-
ment AI). Again, Homer' s opening verse of the Iliad comes in for criticism:
when he sang "Goddess, sing of the wrath", he was using a command-form,
instead of a prayer (Fragment A 29 = Aristotle Poetics 19.1456^5). How
seriously this 'criticism' was intended, is a different matter.
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Not all sophists rejected the natural 'correctness' of language, in the sense
of an accurate correspondence between names and things. The correlation
between such a rejection and a relativist view of ethics was mirrored in the
opposite case: a belief in fixed ethical values tended to entail a certain faith
in the epistemological reliability of language. The sophist Prodicus, a contem-
porary of S ocrates and Democritus (5 th Century B c E ), reacted to Democritus'
claim that language rested on coincidence and convention. Democritus' claim
was based on the absence of a one-to-one correspondence between linguistic
entities and elements in the world around us. One example of this deficient
correspondence was the existence of synonyms. Prodicus analysed groups
of synonyms to prove that, in fact, they were not true synonyms. There were
minute differences in their semantic load, äs he demonstrated by a method
ofdiairesis "distinction":
"Prodicus tried to assign a meaning of its own to each of these names, äs the Stoics did
[follow examples]" (Prodikos de epeiräto hekastöi tön onomatön toutön idion ti
semainomenon hupotassein, hösperkai hoi apö tes Stoäs, Fragment A 19 (= Alexander
on Aristotle's Topics B 6.112b22).
Heinimann (I945:i56ff.) rightly emphasi/es the hidden philosophical
agenda: a successful defence of language's accurate reflection of even the
subtlest distinctions in reality (orthotes onomatön) is a strong argument
against relativism and scepticism (cf. Momigliano 1929-30:102). And
Prodicus' interest in questions of ethics and norms is borne out by his parable
of Heracles on the crossroads. In sum, both the sophists who held a relativist
position and those who did not, employed arguments from the nature of
language, a fashionable problem in the intellectual discourse of the time.
Distinguishing synonyms and demanding a proper choice of words gained
a permanent place in later linguistic theory, more specifically in rhetoric.
Traces of the practice can be found in all corpora of scholia, usually in the
stylized form "word χ and word y differ: for ..." (diapherei to A kal to B,
hoti...). Accordingly, akurologia, the use of an improper word when a better
one was available, could be regarded äs one of the three major vices of speech.
By the second half of the 5th Century a shift in academic interest had
occurred. Formerly, intellectuals had discussed the nature of language äs a
corollary to the study of nature and the search for its ultimate principles.
Language was thought to contain a key to the Trum. Now, intellectual circles
focused increasingly on the different ways one could use language. The
difference is clear: language is no longer primarily regarded äs an Instrument
to acquire knowledge, but to bring about actions or to influence attitudes.
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Rhetoncians in particular explore the ethical and pracücal consequences of
usmg language äs a psychagogical device to enthrall and captivate the audi-
ence, Gorgias (483-376 BCE) is the outstanding example of an orator who
goes all out for acoustic effect, brmgmg his audience m a kmd of trance At
the same Urne, he also affirms the basic impossibihty of true communication
because of the mtnnsic incommensurability of language and its objects there
is no way words can convey, for mstance, a colour (Fragment B 3a) Whüe
Parmenides asserted the identity of being, thought and Speech in the Way of
Truth, Gorgias systematically mvalidated this claim
' He says that nothmg exists and if it exists, that it cannot be known and if it both exists
and can be known it cannot be communicated to others (ouk emai phesin ouden ei
d estin agnoston emai ei de kai esti kai gnöston all ou delöton allois, De Melissa
Xenophane Gorgia 979312f)
Under these circumstances, the only role left for language is that of a drug
Accordmgly, Gorgias devoted his energy to the production of show-pieces,
designed to stun
The histonan Thucydides (2ndhalf of the 5th Century BCE) offers a strikmg
analysis of a shrewd, pohtically manipulative use of evaluative terms, New
Speak avant la lettre Commentmg on the idea that war bnngs out the worst
in people, he gives the following Illustration (3 82 4)
"Further, they exchanged their usual verbal evaluations of deeds for new ones, m the
light of what they now thought jusüfied, thus irrational daring was considered courage
for the sake of the Party, prudent delay, specious cowardice' (kai ten eiöthuian axio v«
tononomatönei, laergaantellaxan teidikaiösei tolmamengaralogistosandnaphile
tairos enomisthe mellesis depromethes deüia euprepes, Histones 3 82 4, tr Wilson)
This text both suggests that there is an absolute norm of descnbmg and
evaluating certain types of behaviour, and at the same time that a conven-
tional use of language can be highly (and misleadmgly) suggestive
By the end of the 5th Century BCE, intellectuals were sharply aware of the
poetic, rhetoncal and philosophical potential of language 'Meanmg' was
located m the relationship between words and things, m the opinion of the
Speakers about the world around them, and in the effect words have All these
themes were to be taken up and connected by Plato
6. Plato: the limits of language
When Plato (427-347 BCE) wrote his Cratylus, one of the semmal works in
the history of linguistic thought, language was defmitely on the intellectual
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agenda. The epistemological reflections of the pre-Socratics, and the anthro-
pological and political interests of the Sophists had been underpinned by
various arguments derived from language. Both groups had mainly been
concerned with the relationship between language (names) and reality, and
between words, knowledge and truth, and this was to be the central issue in
the Cratylus äs well. But why did Plato feel it imperative to address the issue,
and what place does the linguistic question occupy in his philosophy ? These
questionsmust bedealt with afteradiscussionof the contents of the dialogue.
Socrates is asked to adjudicate in a debate between Hermogenes and
Cratylus. Both positions are initially presented by Hermogenes himself; that
of Cratylus is reported äs follows:
"Cratylus, whom you see here, Socrates, says that everything has a right name of its own,
which comes by nature, and that a name is not whatever people call a thing by agree-
ment, just a piece of their own voice applied to the thing, but that there is a kind of
inherent correctness in names, which is the same for all men, both Greeks and barbari-
ans" (Kratulos phesin hode, o Sakrales, onomatos orthoteta emai hekastöi ton ontön
phusei pephukman, kal ou toüto emai onoma ho an tines sunthemenoi kalem kalosi,
tis hauton phönes morion epiphthengomenoi, allä orthoteta tina ton onomatön
pephukenai kal Hellest kal barbarois ten auten hapasin, Crat. 383a4ff.; tr. Fowler).
And Hermogenes' own, opposing view is expressed shortly afterwards:
"I cannot come to the conclusion that there is any correctness of names other than
convention and agreement. For it seems to me that whatever name you give to a thing
is its right name; and if you give up that name and change it for another, the later name
is no less correct than the earlier, just äs we change the names of our servants; for I think
no name belongs to any particular thing by nature, but only by the habit and custom
of those who employ it and who established the usage" (ou dunamai peisthenai hos
alle tis orthotes onomatos e suntheke kal homologia. emol gär dokeihoti an tis toi thetai
onoma, toüto emai tö orthon; kal an aüthis ge heteron metathetai, ekemo de meketi
kalei, ouden hetton tö husteron orthos ekhein toüproterou, hosper tois oiketais hemeis
metatithemetha: ou gär phusei hekastöi pephukenai onoma ouden oudeni, allä nomöi
kal ethei ton ethisantön te kal kalountön, Crat. 384ciO-d3, tr. Fowler).
It should be pointed out at once that both debaters are agreed on the essential
correctness of names (onomatön orthotes). It is the source and definition of
that correctness that is at issue. This is also clear from the way in which they
both reconcile the existence of different languages with this presupposed
correctness. Cratylus can refer to a correctness transcending the individual
languages (worked outby Socrates in 389d4ff.); Hermogenes to the existence
of different, but equally valid conventions (sSsdgff.).
A second point is that the Cratylus is not concerned with the origin of
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names or language. That names have at one point come into being is taken
for granted by both parties, and it is more or less indifferent whether language
was created by a god or a man, or by human society at large. Indeed, through-
out the dialogue the name-giver is variously described in the singular and the
plural, äs god or man, or äs 'men of old'. The central question is the relation-
ship between words and reality. Cratylus does not ask himself whether names
are phusei "by nature", but whether their orthotes "correctness" is by
nature, and mutatis mutandis the same goes for Hermogenes: his concern is
not with a supposedly conventional origin of names, but with their conven-
tional correctness. On both views language was 'given' at some point; "by
nature" does not refer to a spontaneous coming-into-being.
Socrates first takes up Hermogenes' position for investigation and develops
a first theory of meaning in six moves. First, he gets Hermogenes to agree
that it is possible to speak the truth, and, hence, to give names in accordance
with what is (a fixed ousia "being"); Hermogenes turns out not to insist on
an extreme relativism (385aiff.) (i). Then, the essentially communicative
(didactic) function of language and names is established, leading up to the
following conclusion (2):
"A name is, then, an Instrument of teaching and of separating reality" (onoma am
didaskalikon tiestin organon kal diakritikon tes ousias, Crat. 388bl3f., tr. Fowler).
Thirdly, it is agreed, without any discussion, that "custom" (or "law")
(nomos) creates language, and that whoever uses words, uses the work of an
"establisher of custom" or a "lawgiver" (nomothetes, 388d-e) (3), and then
the question is tackled how this name-giver proceeds in giving names. Socra-
tes submits that in fact "nature" (phusis) is taken into account at this stage.
The name-giver concentrates on the "absolute or ideal name" (autö ekemo
ho estin onoma, Crat. 389dv) and on the object that should be named. He then
creates a 'name' for this object in a phonetic form that is in itself indiffer-
ent—which explains the existence of different languages. As long äs the
name-giver keeps the Form (eidos) of Name in mind, he will be a good
nomothetes (4):
"Then, my dear friend, must not the lawgiver also know how to embody in the sounds
and syllables each object' s natural name? Must he not make and give all his names with
his eye fixed upon the absolute or ideal name, if he is to be an authoritative giver of
names? And if different lawgivers do not embody it in the same syllables, we must not
be mistaken about this on that account; for different smiths do not embody the form
in the same iron, making the same Instrument for the same purpose, but so long äs they
reproduce the same ideal, though it be in different iron, still the Instrument is äs it should
be, whether it be made here or in foreign lands, is it not?" (är' oün, o belaste, kal to
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hekastöi phusei pephukos onoma tön nomotheten ekemon eis toüs phthongous kal täs
sullabäs dei epistasthai tithenai, kal bleponta prös autö ekemo ho esttn onoma, panta
ta onomata potem te kal tithesthai, ei mellei kurios emai onomatön thetes"? ei de nie
eis täs autäs sullabäs hekastos ho nomothetes tithesm, ouden deitoüto a<mphi>gnoem
oude gär eis ton autön sideron hapas khalkeüs tithesm, toü autoü heneka pown to autö
organon, all' homös, heös an ten auten idean apodidöi, eante en allöi sideröi, homös
orthös ekhei to organon, eante enthade eante en barbarois tis poiel e gar7, Crat
389014-39032, tr Fowler, adapted)
The efficacity of the name-giver's work will be judged by the user, the
dialektikos (390011) (5). And Socrates concludes (6):
"Then, Hermogenes, the givmg of names can hardly be, äs you imagme, a tnflmg matter,
or a task for tnflmg or casual persons and Cratylus is nght m saymg that names belong
to thmgs by nature and that not every one is an artisan of names, but only he who keeps
in view the name which belongs by nature to each particular thing and is able to embody
itsformmthelettersandsyllables" (Kmduneuei am, ö Hermogenes, emaiouphaülon,
hos sü oiet, he toü onomatos thests, oude phaulön andrön oude ton epitukhontön. kal
Kratulos alethe legei legön phusei ta onomata emai tols pragmasi, kal ou panta
demiourgön onomatön emai, allä monon ekemon ton apobleponta eis to tn phusei
onoma ön hekastöi kal dunamenon autoü to eidos tithenai eis te tä grammata kal täs
sullabäs, Crat 39od7-e4, tr Fowler)
On this view, the Form or Idea (eidos), the "natural name for each thing"
(to tei phusei onoma ön hekastöi) mediales between individual names and
individual items in the world—in fact, it functions äs their meaning.
Now that it has been established that there is some natural correctness of
names (orthotes), a further investigation of its nature triggers the exposition
of a second theory of meaning. Claiming to experience a sudden Inspiration,
Socrates identifies the source of correctness of names in Homer (39334 ff.):
it consists in the primacy of meaning, dunamis, over form. The form of a
word may change, while its meaning remains unaffected, and this can disturb
a name's perspicuity. The constancy of meaning had always been, and was
to remain, the basic pnnciple of ancient etymology, and it is first formulated
in the Cratylus (393dif.; 394b2ff.). Socrates then launches into a series of
etymologies, profiting from his fit of 'superhuman wisdom' (39608). There
is a lot of irony in the etymological section which follows, especially the
repeatedreferences to Socrates' miraculous Inspiration (e.g. 396eiff.; 399ai;
40167; 409diff.; 41063). Several etymologies are obviously intended ironi-
cally äs well, äs when "heroes" (heroes) is first almost derived from "love"
(erös) because heroes spring from the love of a god for a mortal woman or
that of a goddess for a mortal man. Socrates then quickly gives the argument
a turn and derives the word from erötaö "to ask" or eirein "to say", which
THE GREEK TRADITION l8l
makes the heroes into the forerunners of the rhetoricians and sophists (Crat.
398c6ff.). Or the impossible Selaenoneoaeia (409512), "the one who has
an old and a new gleam", which is posited äs the origin of Selanaia "moon'',
making its name coincide with (and anticipate!) the views defended by
Anaxagoras: Hermogenes cannot refrain from commenting on its "opera
bouffe" (dithurambodes, tr. Fowler) character (Crat. 409ciff.). A compara-
ble instance is when the word for "name" (onoma) is derived from "a being
that one is searching for" (on, hoü masma estin, Crat. 42ibi), relating it
directly to the present conversation—but also to the name-giver's activity.
In the course of the etymological section, Socrates expounds his second
theoryofmeaning:namesrepresentearlierpeople'sinterpretationsofreality
(cf. 40iaiff.); in that sense many of the etymologies can be taken seriously
in that they are genuine reflections of existing views on the cosmos (accord-
ing to Goldschmidt 1940 they represent a complete Heraclitean cosmology;
he thinks Socrates is made to expound what were basically Cratylus' etymo-
logical theories here). Their quantity may be explained by the fact that they
are supposed to represent a systematic account of nature, while the humorous
touches are part of the literary make-up of the dialogue. Socrates' hypothesis
is, that many names were imposed by people holding Heraclitean convictions,
and he accordingly proceeds to explain a whole series of names on the suppo-
sition that 'flux' was their underlying principle. Throughout he keeps stress-
ing that no serious explanations are to be expected from him (4o6b9f.; cf.
39ia4 ff.). Moreover, Socrates seems fully aware of the arbitrary character
of his etymological method (4i4dv ff.).
When the etymological section narrows down to an investigation of the
'first words', the elements to which the other words can be reduced
(422b6ff.), Socrates argues that these 'first words' are formed on the basis
of sound symbolism; they make something clear (delöma 42 3b i f.) according
to a mimetic principle (423b4ff.). The sounds are not just onomatopoeic, but
they copy "being" (ousid) äs their model (42301 ff.). At this point it is made
clear once again that 'being' does not allow of relativism.
In the last third of the dialogue, Cratylus takes over the role of Socrates'
interlocutor from Hermogenes (427C9ff.). His position was that names are
always correct, or they stop being names at all—convention does not come
into it. Socrates makes Cratylus admit the relevance of convention and give
up his epistemological claim that whoever knows a thing' s name, knows the
thing itself. In order to drive home the former point, Socrates makes Cratylus
acknowledge the possibility of saying something which is not true, i.e. to use
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names that do not reflect reality perfectly. (It may be remembered that he
used the reverse strategy against Hermogenes who was made to admit the
possibility of 'true' Speech.) Names are imitations of things (430aio). Since
every Imitation differs qualitatively from its model (otherwise it would be
a complete duplicate, not an Imitation), there is always a qualitative margin
between a name and that of which it is the name: this means names may be
more or less successful (432a8ff.; dy). Cratylus has to admit that it is custom
or convention that makes people understand each other in spite of the imper-
fections that names may contain (435a2ff.). A word may be äs similar to the
thing it denotes äs possible, but f or the remaining part it functions by conven-
tion (435 b-c). The principle that words Imitate things also makes a guest-
appearance in Plato's Sophist: people may be deceived into the belief that
what is said is actually real, because there is a similarity between words and
things. Thus, discourse (logoi) is in a sense no more than "spoken images"
(eidöla legomena, Sophist 23406); it is not the real thing. But then, in a sense,
neither is the perceptible world äs a whole.
After this demonstration of the influence of convention on name-giving,
Cratylus'epistemologicalpositionisunderminedbySocrates'demonstration
that names only lead to knowledge of the namegiver's opinions on things,
not to that of the things themselves (436051".). If the namegiver's principles
are misguided, bis whole vocabulary will suffer from this vitium originis. (At
this point, Socrates shows that many words may be regarded äs being formed
on a principle, not that the world is in a state of continuous flux (Heraclitus'
theory), but that it is at rest (the view of Parmenides and his school, the
Eleatics) (43731 ff.). Therefore, it is impossible to ascribe an essential correct-
ness of names to divine Intervention: this very inconsistency in the guiding
principles of the lexicon forbids it (438c5). He then raises the question of the
source of the namegiver' s knowledge of things. Obviously, this source cannot
be the names themselves (which are yet to be given). Rather, it is extra-
linguistic reality itself, that should be studied if one wants to acquire knowl-
edge about it (438d2ff.; 438e2f.; 439byf.): the source of knowledge mustbe
sought in the Originals, not the copies (i.e. the names) (439a5)—again the
model-imitation relationship is stressed. The existence of absolute ethical
notions is posited (439c8). This means that serious doubt is cast on the
Heraclitean principles which apparently were at the basis of so many names.
Socrates ends with a grave warning against blindly entrusting oneself to
names:
"But surely no man of sense can put himself and his soul under the control of names,
and trust in names and their makers to the point of affirming that he know anything"
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(oude panu noün ekhontos anthropou epitrepsanta onomasin hautön kal ten hautoü
psukhen therapeuein pepisteukota ekeinois kal tois themenois auta, düskhurizesthai
hos ti eidota, 4400, tr. Fowler).
And the dialogue ends on a protreptic note: the topic requires further study.
Plato' s Socratic dialogues are to a large extent concerned with establishing
the Status, ontological and epistemological, of ethical concepts. Takingposi-
tion against the 'relativism' of certain Sophists, who denied the existence of
fixed and absolute ethical values, Plato makes his Socrates search for Truth
in conversations with various interlocutors. The final object of these investi-
gations is the Good, which is identical to the Beautiful. To Plato's Socrates
knowledge of the Good ensures possession of the Good, and thus of Virtue.
Whoever knows what is good, will always act virtuously. The dialectical
process, the joint effort in which Socrates and his interlocutors try to attain
insight in ethical questions by a succession of questions and answers, involves
delivering these interlocutors from their false assumptions and Claims to a
knowledge that they do not possess. Socrates himself does not lay claim to
any firm knowledge ('Socratic irony'); his competence i s that of a midwife
(his mother's profession), and thus he is able to make people give birth to
whatever their minds are carrying. These Spiritual children are then tested
for viability in a process of elenkhos "cross-examination", "refutation",
and their 'fathers' should be able to account for them (logon didonai). If they
are not, they will reach a stage of healthy perplexity (aporid); once they
realize that they do not know what they thought they knew, there is a basis
for a constructive re-investigation of the issue. Theaetetus, for example, is
asked what 'knowledge' is. Once he grasps the difference between giving
an example and formulating a definition, he produces several definitions,
which are then successively refuted and discarded. Knowledge does not equal
sense-perception, nor true opinion, nor "true opinion, accounted for".
Equally, in the Loches, several definitions of 'courage' are tested, in the Lysis
definitions of 'friendship', etcetera. The definitions do not constitute conclu-
sions of research, rather they are its starting-point.
It is obvious that this dialectical process, which is at the very basis of the
Platonic, or at least of the Socratic, enterprise, is seriously endangered by the
extreme views of language that were populär at the time. Strangely enough,
Cratylus' and Hermogenes' positions form an equally severe threat to it. In
both cases, language is always 'correct', even if in the former case this
correctness is legitimized by 'nature', and in the latter by convention. On
Hermogenes' view, the intersubjectivity required by dialectics is replaced
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by pure subjectivism. If every one is entitled to create his own language, and
to assign individual meanings to names, there can be no common search for
truth. (Hermogenes keeps shifting back and forth between convention äs a
function of the individual and of the Community, see e.g. 385a4 f.) On
Cratylus' view, on the other hand, every name (and every proposition) is true,
or it simply is not a name any longer. There is no point in investigating names
(or defmitions) in a search for an ulterior truth. This view reduces one to utter
inertia; it would mean the end of dialectics äs a process of inquiry to get
beyondmere names and appearances. But, äs Socrates points out, accounting
for a name does not equal grasping a concept.
Not only is this made clear in the final section of the dialogue, but it is also
anticipated almost incidentally in the etymological section, when Socrates
examines the names of the virtues. The "just" (to dikaion) is supposed to
be derived from dia'ion, "passing through (all other things)" with an inter-
posed k. So far many people would agree, but beyond that they differ
(412c8ff.). Even if we agree that the word dikaion is formed on the supposi-
tion that everything is in flux, that does not provide us with any essential in-
sight in the nature of justice itself:
"Up to this point... many men agree about justice (dikaion); and I, Hermogenes, being
very much in earnest about it, have persistently asked questions and have been told in
secret teachings that this is justice, or the cause—for that through which creation takes
place is a cause—and some one told me that it was for this reason rightly called Zeus
(Dia; accusative of Zeus, but also a preposition meaning 'through, because of')· But
when, after hearing this, I nevertheless ask them quietly,'What then, my most excellent
friend, if this is true, is justice?', they think I am asking too many questions and am
leaping over the trenches. They say I have been told enough; they try to satisfy me by
saying all sorts of different things, and they no longer agree" (mekhri men oün entaütha
... paräpollon homologeitai toüto einai to dikaion. ego de, ö Hermogenes, hate lipares
on perl autoff, taüta men panta diapepusmai en aporrhetois, hoti toüto esti to dikaion
kai to aition—di' ho gär gignetai, toüt' esti to aition—km "Dia" kalem ephetis toüto
orthos ekhein diä taüta. epeidän d' erema autoüs epaneröto akousas taüta meden
hetton: "Ti oün pol' estin, o ariste, dikaion, ei toüto houtös ekhei?" doko te ede
makrotera toü prosekontos erötän kal huper tä eskammena hallesthai. hikanos gar me
phasipepusthai kal epikheiroüsin, boulomenoi apopimplanai me, alias alla ede legein,
kai ouketi sumphönoüsin, Crat. 4i262ff.).
Socrates then sums up the different answers he was given: One man says
justice is the Sun, another says it's fire, or just the heat that is in fire; yet
another adheres to Anaxagoras' view and claims that justice is 'mind'
(4i3b3ff.)·
"Then, my friend, I am far more perplexed than before I undertook to learn about the
nature of justice. But I think this name—and that was the subject of our investiga-
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tion — was given to it for the reasons I have mentioned" (entaütha de ego, ophtte, polü
en pleioni aporiai eiml eprln epikheiresai manthanein perl tau dikaiou hotipot ' estin.
all' oün hoüper heneka eskopoümen, to ge onoma toüto phainetai autöi diä taüta
kelsthai, Crat.
We are on well-known Socratic terrain here, and there is great irony in
Hermogenes' completely misguided reaction: he cannot believe that this
undoubtedly Socratic Intervention was not actually taken over from someone
eise! On the other hand, he assumes that the rest of the etymologies are
original. (Accordingly, Socrates announces that he will try to keep up the
deceit (4i3d3 ff.).) The distinction Socrates draws in 4i3a5ff. is subtle, yet
vital: he is convinced he knows why the name has been given, and in that
sense he knows its correctness. But this teaches him nothing about the essen-
tial concept to which the name refers. Names and their 'definitions' should
indeed be a starting-point, there is no way one can stop short at it. This is the
reason why it is essential for Plato to come to grips with the question of the
nature of names, to eliminate any false expectations of this kind; this is
arguably the main raison d'etre of the Cratylus. Interestingly enough, the
literary form of the dialogue itself , representing three people searching for
truth, underscores the Platonic position and undermines that of both
Hermogenes and Cratylus: the dialogue demonstrates the relevance of the
dialectical method, in that that method is its structuring principle. In that
sense, the Cratylus is a Ιεςοη par l'exemple.
The two theories of meaning put forth in the Cratylus are both based on
the principle of Imitation, with different objects. Either language imitates
reality and there is a direct link between linguistic phenomena and the onto-
logical level; or language imitates a thought. This latter view on which names
are the namegiver's Interpretation of reality, is related to taking language äs
verbalized thought (and thought äs an internal dialogue, Sophist 2636), and
that is in effect what we find in the Theaetetus, where Socrates and Theaetetus
agree that one of the possible meanings of the word logos is
"making one's own thought clear through speech by means of verbs and nouns, imaging
the opinion in the stream that flows through the lips, äs in a mirror or water" (to ten
hautoü dianoian emphane poiem diä phönes metä rhematön te km onomatön, hosper
eis katoptron e hudör Un doxan ektupoumenon eis ten diä toü stomatos rhoen,
Theaetetus 2o6diff., tr. Fowler).
The idea that language is an Imitation of thought processes also appears in
the Republic, and it was to trigger a reaction from Aristotle, äs we will see
(Section 7). In the Republic Socrates argues that falsehood is incompatible
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with the nature of the gods, and he makes the following comment on spoken
falsehood:
"But surely it would be most wholly right... to describe this äs in very truth falsehood,
ignorance naraely in the soul of the man deceived. For the falsehood in words is a copy
of the affection in the soul, an after-rising image of it and not an altogether unmixed
falsehood" (allä men orthotata g' an ... toüto hos alethos pseüdos kaloito, he en tei
psukhei agnoia he tou epseusmenou, epel to ge en tois logois mimema ti toü en tei
psukhei estl pathematos km husteron gegonös eidölon, oupanu akraton pseüdos, Rep.
n,382b6ff.; tr. R. Waterfield).
In view of the importance attributed in Plato's philosophical thought to the
relationship between model and copy, it comes äs no surprise to find language
fitted into this conceptual framework äs well. The frequent references in the
Cratylus to language's essential Status of being a copy or Imitation, and its
concomitant devaluation äs an immediate heuristic device in the search for
the absolute truths that belong to the model only, find their place in the same
battle against relativism that eventually produced the theory of Forms.
Plato returns to the relationship between names, knowledge and reality in
his Seventh Letter—if it is really his—, in which he explains why true philo-
sophical thought can never be laid down in something äs fixed äs writing.
In fact, the theory expounded here can be seen äs the negative corollary of
the theories of the Cratylus: there, the necessity of the (oral) dialectical
process was put forth by denying the value of names by themselves. Here,
the low Status of names is used äs an argument against written theories: since
every expression is imperfect, it will never do to let it acquire a fixed and
permanent state that does not allow of deliberation anymore.
In this letter, Plato distinguishes between names, definitions and images,
three factors contributing to a fourth level, that of knowledge; all four levels
are concerned with qualities, but the real essence of a thing is something
separate again, a fifth item in the series. Names and definitions are vocal
utterances (enphönais), images are corporeal, knowledge is something that
exists in the soul: all four are therefore essentially external to and different
from the essence; they are so many starting-points for a dialectical process
of questioning and answering, of refuting false views and looking for the
truth. Nothing committed to writing could be absolutely identical to the fifth
element, the object of research. Once again, names is where philosophical
enquiry Starts, not where it ends (Epistle vn, 342a-344d).
One more text mustbe discussed here, because ittakes the study of seman-
tics one important step further. So far, the individual name was taken äs the
bearer not only of meaning, but also of truth and falsity. Both in the Cratylus
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and in the Theaetetus, this had caused major difficulties in investigating the
possibility of falsehood. A solution is reached in the Sophist. In Sophist
26id5ff., the Eleatic stranger who is talking with Theaetetus establishes the
fact that not all words combine with each other indifferently; the resulting
combination must be meaningful:
"This, perhaps, is what you mean, that those which are spoken in order and raean some-
thing do unite, but those that mean nothing in their sequence do not unite?" (Tö toionde
legeis isös hoti tä men ephexes legomena kai deloünta ti sunarmottei, tä de tei
sunekheiai meden semainonta anarmostei, Sophist 26ld8ff., tr. Fowler).
In order to deserve the predicate 'a good fit', meaningful words must be
combined, or words must be combined (a syntactical criterium, cf. ephexes
legomena "spoken one after the other"; tei sunekheiai "in their sequence";
cf. sumploke 202c6) in a meaningful way (a semantic criterium, cf. deloünta
ti "making something clear"; semainonta "signifying"). The "Stranger"
goes on to explain that there are two basic types of "vocal indications of
being" (esti gär hemm ton teiphöneipen ten ousian delömatön dittön genos,
Sophist 26165), namely "names" (onomatä) and predicates (rhemata}
(Sophist202ai). A 'predicate' is "theindication whichrelates to action" (to
... epl tais praxesin on delönia), or, somewhat differently phrased (202b)
"predicates signify actions" (praxeis semainei rhemata); a 'name' is "the
vocal sign applied to those who perform the action in question" (to ... ep'
autois tois ekema prattousi semeion tes phönes epitetheh). (Plato does not
distinguish the way predicates refer to actions from that in which names refer
to things or people, cf. Denyer 1991:164ff.) It takes both names and predi-
cates to produce a Statement, or sentence (logos) (202a9ff.), which fulfils the
function of "making something clear" (deloüh), just like its constituentparts
(202d2). On the other hand, it also outdoes both names and predicates taken
in Isolation; when someone utters the sentence "man learns":
"he makes a Statement about that which is or is becoming or has become or is to be; he
does not merely give names (onomazei), but he reaches a conclusion by combining verbs
with names" (deloi gär Sde pou tote perl ton ontön e gignomenön e gegonotön e
mellontön kai ouk onomazei monon, alla ti perainei, sumplekön tä rhemata tots
onomasi, Sophist 2Ö2d2ff., tr. Fowler).
Discoursing' is more than mere 'naming'. And 'being the case' is something
eise than 'being meaningful', äs becomes apparent when the stranger goes
on to analyse the sentences "Theaetetus sits", and "Theaetetus, with whom
I am talking, flies" (203b4ff.). "Here the Stranger speaks of things that are
saidto'beconcerning' [or: 'beabout'is](efnaz'pen')Theaetetus ...;thething
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that in the true sentence is said to 'be concerning' Theaetetus actually 'is
concerning' him, whereas its counterpart in the false sentence actually 'is not
concerning' him" (Denyer 1991:173). Unfortunately, what exactly these
'things' are is left unclear. A little later on, thought (dianoia) couched in
words is said to comprise affirmation and negation (phasis and apophasis,
2636).
It will be remembered that in the Cratylus neither Hermogenes nor Cratylus
(nor, arguably, Plato himself at the time) had grasped the fundamental differ-
ence between being meaningful and being true. Neither had sought the truth
orfalsehoodof a Statement in its "combination" sunthesis, or in the fact that
it asserted anything of a given person or thing. Both believed that falsehood
was impossible, since truth resided in the individual name, and the individual
name was correct (either conventionally, or by nature) (cf. Denyer 1991:
7iff.). Hermogenes assented to Socrates' proposition that true speech must
consist of true parts. Therefore, if words are always (conventionally) true,
falsehood is impossible (385b2ff.). Equally, on Cratylus' view falsehood is
impossible (429c6ff.), since words are correct by nature. When names are
not correct, they are simply names no longer. The solution reached in the
Sophist was to be put to good use by Aristotle (see Section 7).
For Plato, the interest of language äs a topic of research was completely
bound up with bis view of the world. Like every other phenomenon under
the moon, language is an Imitation of reality; there is no way in which it can
lead one directly to the ultimate Truths. The best one can do, is to use it in
a process of question and answer, a dialectical attempt to ascend to the
absolute values of the Forms.
7. Aristotle: the function of language
The works by Aristotle (384-322 BCE) that have come down to us, cover an
unusually broad area of scientific inquiries, many of them involving problems
of language. Unlike Plato, Aristotle never devoted any separate work to the
analysis of language, but he had occasion to take up questions of language
and signification in the course of his biological and psychological work
(focusing mainly on the acoustic and phonetic aspects), his poetical and
rhetorical theory (in which the pragmatic side of language was dealt with)
and, first and foremost, his logic (cf. Ax 1992).
Aristotle's basic conviction that "nature does nothing in vain" (outhen
... muten he phusis poiei, Pol. I,i I253aio, and saep.) entails that he is
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always interested in a thing's function, in its purpose. If one does not grasp
a thing's purpose, one does not properly know it. This teleological approach
also comes out where language is concerned, äs Aristotle shifts focus from
the biological to the political, rhetorical, poetical or logical functions of
language in accordance with the context of his work (cf. Di Cesare 1980:8;
i59).Forexample,animalsarecapableof "signifying" (semaineiri)plea.svre
and pain by means of their "voice" (phöng, the capacity for articulated
sound-production)—that is what it is for—, but adult human speech needs
has an ethical dimension:
"speech [logos] is designed to mdicate the advantageous and the harmful, and therefore
also the right and the wrong" (ho de logos epl toi deloün estl to sumpheron kai to
blaberon, hoste kal to dikaion kal to adikon, Pol. I,i.i253aioff., tr. Rackham)
Of course, this fits in perfectly with the context of the Politics. In other
contexts, however, it is mainly semanticity that is stressed. Thus, in his
Rhetoric Aristotle takes it that the most important virtue of speech is clarity
(Rhet. 111,2.1404bif.):
"An argument for this is that speech, if it does not convey meamng (deloi, if it does not
make something clear), will not fulfil its proper task (ergon)" (semewn gär hon ho
logos, eän me deloi, ou poiesei to heautoü ergon, Rhet. 111,2.1404b2f).
Aristotle also pays much attention to the function of language in his logic.
The group of treatises known äs the Organon consists of six works. It forms
a series leading from an analysis and classification of being from a logi-
cal/semantic point of view (Categories), to a treatise on judgement (assertion
and negation) (On Interpretation), typical forms of dialectical arguments
(Topics), a classification of invalid reasoning, mainly based on confusion over
the relationship between language and reality (SophisticalRefutations), and,
finally, to the theory of the scientific syllogism (Prior and Posterior
Analytics).
It is a frustrating enterprise to add one more discussion of the beginning
of On Interpretation to the long list of those already in existence, and one
can hardly hope to be original in its execution. The title of the work (Perl
hermeneias) is interesting in itself: hermeneia means "Interpretation, expla-
nation"; the title mayrefer eitherto the "Interpretation" (or: "expression")
of thoughts by words, or, going one stage back in what eventually amounts
to the same process, to "the Interpretation of reality by means of a judge-
ment" (Arens 1984:17). The former view is supported by a parallel from
Poetics, where "diction" (lexis) is explained äs "the expression (of thought)
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through the use of words" (ten diä tes onomasias hermeneian, Poet.
6.1450b 13f.; cf. Weidemann 1994:43). The latter seems preferable, however,
in view of the content of On Interpretation: although the first four chapters
do indeed deal with the relationship between thought and expression, and the
nature of the constituent elements of meaningful speech, these chapters only
serve äs preliminary material for the more important analysis of 'positive and
negative judgements' that is to follow. On either Interpretation, the title bears
some similarity to the second 'theory of language' from the Cratylus, in
which names were seen äs the embodiment of the namegiver's opinions, and
this will be borne out by Aristotle' s text. It goes without saying that in read-
ing Aristotle, it is always imperative to keep in mind the possibility that he
refers to Plato. The esoterical nature of most of the Aristotelian corpus,
mostly lecture notes and other forms of writing that were not destined for the
general public, hardly ever allows scope for explicit polemic—Aristotle often
rejects alternative or conflicting views implicitly.
The opening section of On Interpretation offers a brief outline of a seman-
tic theory. Its laconic form makes it seductively easy to read all kinds of later
developments back into it.
"First we must determine whal onoma and what rhema is, and after that, what negation,
affirmation, Statement [or: proposition], and sentence. The spoken forms are Symbols
of the affections in the soul, and the written forms are Symbols of the spoken forms.
And just äs the letters are not the same foreveryone so are not the vocal forms; but what
all these forms [sc. the written and spoken ones] are primarily Symbols of, the affections
in the soul, they are the same for all people, and what the latter are likenesses of, the
things, they are also the same. Of these matters we speak in our book On the Soul, for
this is a different subject" (Proton dei thesthai ti onoma km ti rhema, epeita ti estin
apophasis kal kataphasis kal apophansis kal logos. Esti inen oün tä en teiphönei ton
en teipsukhei'pathematön sumbola, kal tä graphomena ton en teiphönei. kal hosper
oude grammata päsi tä auta, oude phönal hai autai; hon mentoi taüta semeTa protön,
tautä päsi pathemata tespsukhes, kal hon taüta homoiomata, pragmata ede tauta. perl
men oün toutön eiretai en tois perl psukhes, alles gärpragmateias, On Interpretation
l6ai-8, tr. Arens 1984, adapted).
Aristotle grounds his theory of the proposition and the judgement in a
broader view of the way language operates. Tä en teiphönei "the spoken
forms", encompass all the items enumerated in the first sentence (Arens
1984:26). If judgements are interpretations of reality that eventually take on
linguistic form, it becomes relevant to investigate the relationship between
words, thought and things, and that is what Aristotle sets out to do.
He designs a hierarchy of symbolical representations, in which writing
symbolically represents speech, while speech symbolically represents tä en
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teipsukheipathemata "the affections in the soul". I take this (with Ax
1992:253) äs primarily referring to sense perception; however, since thought
(mentioned in loaio noema) functions rather similarly to perception on
Aristotle' s view, there is no need to worry about the distinction). The expres-
sion "the affections in the soul" (tä en tei psukhei pathemata) is familiär
fromPlato's Republic (ii,382b9f.; vi,51 idv), discussed in Section 6, butthere
is a subtle difference. Both philosophers are aware of the possibility that
language reflects thought, not reality. But Plato thinks of the relationship
between thought and Speech äs one of model and copy, whereas to Aristotle
language is symbolic. On the first view, a certain natural resemblance be-
tween thought and language is implied. We may compare Isocrates' remark
on the image-like character (eidölon) of language in his speech Nicocles:
"For the power to speak well is taken äs the surest index of a sound understanding, and
discourse which is true and lawful and just is the outward Image of a good and faithful
soul" (... to gär legein hos deitoüphronemeümegistonsemewnpoioumetha, kallogos
alethes km nomimos km dikaios psukhes agathes kai pistes eidölon estin, Nicocles 7;
tr. Norlin).
A symbolical relationship, on the other hand, is purely conventional in nature.
There is no need for a symbol to be in any way similar to the object symbol-
ized. That explains why not everyone has the same writing System, or the
same sounds. Aristotle also Stresses the notion of conventionality in i6a26ff.
in his explanation of the definition of the onoma "name" (covering parts of
what we would call 'noun', 'subject', 'topic'):
" 'Conventional' is said because no word is by nature, but only when it becomes a Sym-
bol; the inarticulate sounds, namely, of wild animals, for instance, also make something
clear, but nothing in them is a word [or: onoma]..." (töde katä suntheken, hotiphusei
ton onomatön ouden estin, all' hotan genetai sumbolon, epei deloüsi ge ti kal hol
agrammatoi psophoi, hown thenön, hon ouden estin onoma, tr. Arens 1984, adapted).
Although this might seem to bring him in proximity to Hermogenes' position,
there is a vital difference. Whereas Hermogenes defended a variant of
orthotes, based on a conventional relationship between words and things,
Aristotle ignores the question of correctness —in a way, the outcome of the
Cratylm itself justifies the Step—, and replaces the problem why names are
äs they are (Cratylus) with the question what they are for (cf. Di Cesare
1980:159). In his view, the concept of conventionality applies to the symbolic
relationship between words and thought. The expression "conventionally"
(katä suntheken) (together with "being a symbol" (sumbolon)) is contrasted
with "by nature" (phusei) here; In On Interpretation 1731 ff. it is opposed
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to "being a tool" (organori) in the definition of the sentence (logos):
"Every sentence is significant, not äs an Instrument, but, äs I said, conventionally" (Esti
de logos hapas men semantikos, oukh hos organon de, all' hösper eiretai, katä
suntheken).
Again, it is clear that the Cratylus (" a name is ... a didactic Instrument which
is able to make distinctions in all that is" (onoma am didaskalikon ti estin
organon kal diakritikdn tes ousias, 388bi2)) lurks in the background, and
its tenets are rejected quite apodictically. The reason why "being significant
äs an Instrument" is opposed to "being significant by convention" appears
to be that the ' Instrument theory' stems from that part of the Cratylus where
Socrates convinces the champion of the convention-theory, Hermogenes, that
Cratylus is at least partially right.
Words (spoken and written) are primarily (protön, used predicatively;
Montanari 1984) signs of the affections in the soul; through these, they
eventually refer to "things" (pragmata) (cf. Weidemann 1994:135; I4if.).
At other places, Aristotle describes names äs Symbols of things without
mentioning the mediating function of the affections in the soul (On Sophisti-
cal Refutation I05a6 ff.), and there is even one passage from the Rhetoric
in which the notion of symbolism is omitted in favour of a purely Platonic
approach. In this passage, Aristotle explains that the poets were the first to
pay attention to style. We are to assume that this makes sense, since their Job
is Imitation. This thought is left implicit, but it is to be gleaned from the
explanation that Aristotle does provide:
"For names are imitations" (tä gäronomata mimemata estin, Rhetoric m,i .I404a2of.)·
However, here I will concentrate on the theory from On Interpretation,
where, äs we saw, theie is ahierarchy of symbolicrelationships, writing being
symbolic of spoken language, and spoken language of the affections in the
soul.
The relationship between "the affections in the soul" and "things",
however, can no longer be described in terms of symbols: mental impressions
are said to be "likenesses" (homoiomata) of things. In order to understand
what is meant by this, it is necessary to follow up Aristotle's own reference
and to consider his views on perception and thought, äs set out in his On the
Soul (Denyer I99i:i86ff., esp. aooff.).
Aristotle believes in the basic accuracy of perception. In his view "percep-
tion is a sort of alteration, an alteration which the thing that is perceived
causes in the thing that perceives it" (Denyer 1991:189; e.g. On the Soul
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416033-5). Since "like causes like", the soul must have the potential for
becoming "like" thething itperceives. Perceptible objects consistof matter
(hule) and the active pnnciple "form" (eidos). A perceptible object is the
cause of the soul's taking on its form, but it does not pass on its matter (nor
is the "matter" of the perceiver affected, Denyer 1991:194). Aristotle illus-
trates this with a famous image:
"We must understand äs true generally of evei y sense that sense is that which is receptive
of the form of sensible objects without the mattei, just äs the wax receives the impres-
sion of the signet-rmg without the iron 01 the gold and receives the Impression of the
gold or bronze, but not äs gold or bronze" (katholou depenpases atstheseös deilabein
hon he men aisthesis esti tö dektikon ton aistheton eidön aneu tes hules, hown ho kerös
toü daktuliou aneu toü sidemu kal toü khi usoü dekhetat to semewn, lambanei de tö
khmsoün e to khalkoün semewn, all' oukh hei khrusös e khalkos, On the Soul
11,12 4243:8ff , tr Hett)
The 'wax-like' quality of the soul entails that the affections (or impressions)
in the soul (pathemata tespsukhes) from On Interpretation are the same for
everyone, äs are the things themselves (i6a6-8). There is an automatic
perception of perceptible forms or perceptible objects. This is the only use
Aristotle has for the relationship between model (original) and copy in the
context of his theory of language. Ax (1992:253) states the results for the
Interpretation of our passage in an exemplary way:
"Das homoiömata von 1637 bezeichnet also nichts anderes als die Identität psychischer
Rezeptionsresultate (pathemata tespsukhes) mit den sie bewirkenden ausserpsychischen
Gegenstanden (pragmata), und zwar im Sinne einer Abbüdungs- und nicht einer
Wesensidentitat"
The text of On Interpretation contmues äs follows:
"Now just äs there are m the mmd concepts which are neither true nor false äs well äs
such äs are necessanly the one or the other, so there are hkewise m speech, because
in composition and division lies falsity or truth The onomata and the rhemata alone
are like concepts without composition and division, for instance 'man' or 'white', when
nothing is added, for then they are neither false nor true This is proved by the fact that
even a Word like goat-stag signifies somethmg, but not yet something true or false with-
out the addition of existence or non-existence, whether absolutely or temporarily" (esti
de, hösper en teipsukheihote men noema aneu toü aletheuem e pseudesthai, hole de
ede höiananke toutön huparkhein thateron, houtö kal en telphönet; perl gär sunthesin
kal diairesin esti tö pseüdos te kal tö alethes tä men oün onomata autä kal tä rhemata
eoike töianeu suntheseös kal dtaireseös noemati, hown to anthröpos e tö leukon, hotan
me prostethei U, oute gär pseüdos oute alethes pö semewn d'estl toüde· kal gär ho
tragelaphos semainei men ti, ούρο de alethes e pseüdos, eän nie to einai e me emai
prostethei, e'haplosekatäkhronon,OnInterpretation 1639-18, tr Arensi984,adapted)
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In this section, Aristotle draws the important distinction between truth-value
and semantic value. Intellect, or thought, adduced äs an example here, func-
tions much in the same way äs does perception (Denyer 1991:203; cf. On the
Soul 429äi3). Thinking of something presupposes that the object of our
thought causes our thought to take on its "form" (eidos) (cf. Denyer
1991:203). For not only does "like cause like", but "like" is also "known
by like" (ginoskesthai to homoion töthomoiöi, On the Soul 405bi5ff.). In
that sense, thought (noema) is always correct, just like perception. In another
sense, however, truth or falsehood do not apply to thought äs such, but only
to complex thought. Where we can go wrong, is when we form judgements.
When we affirm or deny mentally that a concept exists, this will either be true
or false. This may be extended to language, which is, after all, nothing but
a symbol for our mental impressions. Names and predicates taken by them-
selves are neither true nor false. An argument for this is that the name "goat-
stag" has a meaning, but the name by itself cannot be said to be true or false,
unless we affirm or deny its existence (present, past, or future). Similarly it
is pointed out somewhat later (i6b20) that every "predicate" (rhema) is a
name when taken in Isolation; äs such it has meaning (semainei ti), but its
meaning does not include reference to its existence or truthfulness (ei estin l
nie, ούρο semainei). It carries meaning, "for the Speaker stops his process
of thinking and the mind of the hearer acquiesces" (On Interpretation 16b20,
tr. Cook; interestingly, Aristotle refers to the intersubjectivity of meaning
here). This solves the problem of names without referents (cf. the passage
from ps.Hippocrates The Art 6, discussed in Section 5). Here, too, Aristotle
could build on Plato, who had solved this very problem in his Sophist. There,
it is pointed out that the meaning of a name "is independent of anything that
may make it true" (Denyer 1991:181). A sentence carries meaning because
it consists of a meaningful 'name' and a meaningful predicate. Truth and
falsehooddependonthequestionwhethertheproposition 'is' really 'concern-
ing', is really true of, the referent of its'' name " part (onoma). In On Interpre-
tation, the symbolic relationship between language and thought is combined
with this insight into the difference between semanticity and truth or false-
hood. New insight into linguistic meaning results.
The ensuing defmitions of "name" (onoma), "predicate" (rhema), and
sentence (logos) share an emphasis on semanticity:
"The onoma is a vocal form with conventional timeless meaning, no part of which is
significant separately ...
Rhema is what cosignifies time, no part of it has separate meaning, and it is always
the sign of what is said of something eise...
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The sentence is a significant vocal form of whose parts some have meaning sepa-
rately, äs an expression, not äs an affirmation" (onoma men oün esti phöne semantike
katä suntheken aneu khronou, hes meden meros esti semantikön kekhörismenon ...
Rhema de esti töprossemamon khronon, hoü meros ouden semainei khöris, kai estin
aei tön kath' heterou legomenön semeibn ...
Logos de esti phöne semantike, hes tön meron ti semantikön esti kekhörismenon, hos
phasis,all'oukhhöskatäphasis,OnInterpretationi6sLigfi.;i6b6ff.; i6b26ff.,tr.Arens
1984, adapted)
Onoma and rhema are differentiatedby the fact that rhema cosignifies 'time',
while 'time' forms no part of an onoma's meaning. Moreover, rhema is
always a sign for what is predicated of something eise (or: of a predicate).
Among the class of sentences, a further distinction is drawn by means of the
truth criterium: when a sentence admits of truth or falsehood, it is a proposi-
tion (apophantikös logos). And that takes Aristotle to the heart of what he
wanted to discuss in his On Interpretation. Once again the difference with
the Cratylus, but the similarity to the Sophist must be stressed: In the discus-
sion between Cratylus and Socrates on the possibility of falsehood, the
example given was not a proposition, but an address ("Welcome, stranger
from Athens, Hermogenes son of Smicrion", addressed to Cratylus (42964^);
cf. Denyer 72ff.; Hermogenes was in fact the son of Hipponicus). Only in
the Sophist was the discussion restricted to minimal sentences consisting of
what we would call a subject and a predicate.
Aristotle needed the first chapter of On Interpretation to provide some
background Information for his theory of judgement that was to follow. His
rapid sketch of the functioning of language proved to have a rieh potential.
It anticipated many developments in semantic theory, but did no more than
that: its own interests eventually lay elsewhere. If he could pass so rapidly
over the distinction between semanticity and truth value, this was because
he could build on Plato's work here. What was new was his theory of the
linguistic sign, bearing a symbolic relationship to the thought of the Speaker,
and only secondarily to the things.
Apart from the brief outline in the first chapter of On Interpretation,
semantic distinctions play a role in different parts of Aristotle's work (Ax
1992). The points he Stresses are mainly to do with the deficient one-to-one
relationship between words and things, language and concepts. This is impor-
tant, since the starting-point for philosophical investigation is formed by the
concepts people have (endoxa), and these concepts are revealed by language
("the things said", tä legomena). Linguistic expressions of thought, ordinary
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speech and belief about human life (phainomena) must be tested and scruti-
nized, especially if they are in conflict with each other, or if they are not
univocal to begin with. Thus, in a sense language provides both the subject-
matter and the tools of philosophical discourse (cf. Owen 1986).
In his Categories, the first work in the Organon, Aristotle provides a
System for classifying reality from a logico-semantic point of view. The
categories are Substance, Quantity, Quality, Relation, Place, Time, Position,
State/Condition, Action and Passion. The exact Status of the categories is
nowhere made clear; they combine ontological, linguistic (semantic) and
logical characteristics. However, it is clear that Aristotle's starting-point is
reality, and that his distinctions are largely motivated by semantic (and
logical) considerations.
This is borne out by the beginning of the treatise, where Aristotle gives
defmitions of "homonyms" (homonuma), "synonyms" (sunonuma) and
"paronyms" (paronuma). All three terms are primarily used äs modifiers
of elements of reality, not of linguistic entities (cf. Desbordes 1988; Sluiter
1990:125f.). According to Simplicius (6th Century CE), who wrote a com-
mentary on the Categories, Aristotle took over this principle from Speusip-
pus, Plato's successor äs head of the Academy (see Dillon 1977:20; Des-
bordes 1988:58f.). The Categories opens with the following three defmitions:
(1) "Things are equivocally named, when they have the name only in
common, the definition (or Statement of essence) corresponding with the
name being different. For instance, a man and a portrait can both be called
'an animal' (ζοΐοη)" (Homonuma legetai hon onoma monon koinon, ho de
katä tounoma logos tes ousias heteros, hown ζοΐοη ho te anthröpos kai to
gegrammenon, Categories laiff., tr. Cook, adapted).
(2) "Things are univocally named, when not only they bearthe same name
but the Statement of essence corresponding to the name is also the same. Thus
a man and an ox can both be called 'an animal' " (Sunonuma de legetai hon
to te onoma koinon kai ho katä tounoma logos tes ousias ho autos, hown
ζοΐοη ho te anthröpos kai ho boüs, Categories laoff., tr. Cook, adapted).
(3) "Things are 'derivatively' named that derive the way they are called
from something while differing in verbal form, äs for instance 'grammarian'
from 'grammar', from 'heroism', 'hero' and so on" (paronuma de legetai
hosa apo tinos diapheronta teiptosei ten katä tounoma prosegorian ekhei,
hown apo tes grammatikes ho grammatikös kai apo t§s andreias ho andrelos,
Categories iai3ff.).
The first quotation suggests that the term 'homonyms' always refers to
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entities or concepts that do not belong äs species to the same genus, but
whose respective genera happen to share the same name. And they may in
their turn be designated by that common name. Though more sophisticated,
this is not fundamentally different from Homer' s usage, who calls the Greater
and the Lesser Ajax "homonymous" (homonumoijlmd 17.720). Anstelle' s
example (portrait and man) derives from Plato:
"And so we recognize that he who professes to be able by vntue of a smgle art to make
all thmgs will be able by virtue of the pamter's art, to make imitations which have the
same names äs the real thmgs (mimemata kai homonuma ton ontöri), and by showmg
the pictures at a distance will be able to deceive the duller ones among young children
into the belief that he is perfectly able to accomphsh in fact whatever he wishes to do"
(Oukoün ton g' hupi skhnoumenon dunatön βϊηαι miaitekhneipantapoiem gignoskomen
pou toüto, hott mimemata km homonuma tön ontön apergazomeno'i tei graphikeitekhnei
dunatös estai toüs anoetous tön neön paidön, porröthen tä gegrammena epideiknus,
lanthanein hos hotiperän bouletheidrän, toüto hikanötaWibn apotelem ergöi, Sophist
234bsff., tr Fowler)
In other contexts, Aristotle also uses 'homonym' to designate words, rather
than things, e.g. in On Sophistical Refutations I05b33:
"Here 'learn' is equivocal (homonumon), (meanmg) 'understand by usmg knowledge'
and 'acquireknowledge' " (Togärmanthaneinhomönumon, totexunienaikhromenon
tei epistemei kai to lambanem epistemen, tr Forster)
That this is the correct Interpretation is shown by the fact that only in these
contexts can 'homonym' occur in the singular; when referring to entities or
concepts, there is always at least a pair of 'homonyms' involved.
Even more explicitly, in the Rhetoric homonyms are called a type of
'names'/' nouns' that is especially useful to the sophist, while synonyms come
in handy for the poet; here it is obvious that types of words are meant:
"In regard to nouns, homonyms are most useful to the sophist, for it is by their aid that
he employs captious arguments, and synonyms to the poet" (ton d'onomatön töimen
sophisteihomönumiaikhresimoi(parätautasgärkakourgei), töipoieteidesunönumiai,
Rhetoric I404b37ff, tr Freese, cf Slmter 1990 125, cf Rhetoric 111,2 I405aiff for
the use of sunönuma to designate types of words)
In the second quotation from the Categories, however, synonyms—like
homonyms in the same treatise—are entities or concepts. Synonyms belong
äs species to the same genus, thus sharing not only its name, but also its
defmition.
The third type bears the clearest mark of linguistic Inspiration: "paro-
nyms'' are things that get their name from something eise, while the linguistic
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form in which they are expressed is different, but related. The clear relation-
ship between words like 'grammarian' and 'grammar' obviously suggested
their joint classification.
Ax (1992:256) calls attention to the other types of semantic distinctions
that are to be found throughout Aristotle' s work. Especially in his biological
works, Aristotle points out lacunae in the Greek lexicon, where a separate
name (e.g. for a genus that should logically be superordinated to a number
of species) is lacking. The term used is anonumon, and we may compare
Democritus' fourth argument (nonumori) against names being by nature.
Obviously, in this case Aristotle reasons from 'things' to 'names' again, the
nature of the problem forbidding the opposite analysis.
An interesting refmement of the theory of homonymy and synonymy is
the development of a concept of 'focal meaning' (the term is coined by Owen
1986:184; cf. Lloyd I987:i98ff.). 'Focal meaning' is the phenomenon that
there is one focus, one common element in all the senses of a given word
(Owen 1986:183). Words with focal meaning are used "by reference to one
concept" (prös heri) or "taking their origin from one thing" (aph' henos}',
the phenomenon is diagnosed äs "being said in various senses" (pollakhos
legesthai (e.g. Metaphysics m,2.ioo33a33ff.) or "being said in more than
one sense" (pleonakhos legesthai, Topics io6b29ff., and it is explained äs
follows:
"The term 'being' is used in various senses (pollakhos), but with reference to one central
idea (prös heri) and one definite characteristic, and not equivocally (homönumös). Thus
äs the term 'healthy' always relates to health (either äs preserving it or äs producing
it or äs indicating it or äs receptive of it) ... so 'being' is used in various senses, but
always with reference to one principle (To de ön legetai men pollakhos, allä prös hen
kai mt'an tina phusin kai oukh homönumös, all' hosper kai to hugieinön hapan prös
hugieian, to men ίοϊ phulattein to de töipoiem to de toi semewn emai tes hugieias to
d' hoti dektikön autes... houtö de km to ön legetai pollakhos men all' hapan prös mian
arkhen, Metaphysics m,2.ioo3a34ff., tr. Tredennick; cf. Met. ix,3.io6ob3iff.).
Aristotle needs this concept to explain the possibility of one unified theory of
Being in spite of the non-univocal nature of the word "being" (ori) itself,
which has different meanings in different categories (Owen 1986:181 ff.).
The difference with the concept of homonymy from On Categories is, that
the theory of 'focal meaning' Starts from words, not from things. Nor are
words with 'focal meaning' to be identified with "things that are derivatively
named" (pawnuma) (pace ROSS ad Metaphysics m ,2. i O03a34 ff.). Paronyms
are things in the world, while words with 'focal meaning' are precisely that,
namely words. Secondly, words with 'focal meaning' are defmed by their
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relation to one concept (aph' henos), while derivatively named things derive
their names "from something" (apo tinos), but differ in inflected or declined
verbal form (ptosis). And, thirdly, related inflected forms (ptoseis) can be
bearers of focal meaning, butthis is nut necessarily the case. There is no need
to assume that every 'paronym' behaves äs a word with focal meaning,
carrying more than one sense with a common concept äs unifying factor (cf.
Topics I,i5.io6b29 ff.).
In another passage, it seems that (random) 'equivocity' is the general term
of which focal meaning is a special case (Nicomachean Ethics iO96b26 ff.,
with the commentary by Gauthier & Jolif). Aristotle would then distinguish
three different species of the genus 'homonymy', the most common of which
can itself also be called 'homonymy': (i) the case where completely different
and unrelated things share the same name by chance (example: "animal"
(zöwri)—this species may be called 'homonymy' too; it is homonymy par
excellence; (2) 'focal meaning': different things can be called by the same
name because they all relate to the same central concept, be it in different
ways (example: "healthy" (hugieinon)); (3) analogical or proportional
homonymy: things bear the same name, or acquire the same predicate because
they stand in a similar relationship to (ever varying) objects (example:
"good" (agathon): Sight is to body äs intellect is to soul. Therefore, the same
predicate (i.e. "good") can be applied to both sight and intellect.
Interestingly, Aristotle extends the principle of proportionality both to
homonymy and to metaphor (cf. Poetics 2i.i45yb); there, he also explains
the linguistic process involved in terms of a transfer between species and
genera, and evinces a preference for the analogical type. In general, it seems
likely that the theory of 'focal meaning' and of 'proportional homonymy'
originated in a rhetorical, rather than a logical context. This is, I think, clear
from the fact that Aristotle Stresses its argumentative use: any sense applying
to 'healthy' also applies to 'healthily'. This reminds one of the argumentative
'paradigms', groups of forms belonging together (sustoichia; in later theory
suzugia) that are discussed extensively in the Topics (e.g. H4a26ff.) (cf.
Sluiter 1990:84).
Aristotle's contribution to the development of semantics was substantial.
His brief outline in On Interpretation was destined to become the most
discussed text in the history of linguistics. Building on Plato's work, he
explicitly defmed the relationship between language, thought and reality. His
theory of the symbolic (instead of mimetic) nature of the linguistic sign was
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revolutionary. He explained the existence of non-referential terms. In a great
many different contexts, in rhetoric, poetics, phonetics/acoustics, biology and
logic, he tried to clarify the various functions of language, and to determine
what language is for. The fact that language itself, äs the embodiment of
comrnon concepts, formed the starting-point äs well äs the method of doing
philosophy, is made explicit in his theory of the common concepts (endoxä),
opinions (phainomenä) and things said (legomena). These are subjected to
intensive scrutiny to eliminate untenable ones and to establish valid premisses
for scientific discourse.
8. The Hellenistic period: philosophy and philology
In the Hellenistic period (roughly from the death of Alexander (323 BCE) to
the Battle of Actium (31 BCE), new insights in semantics were mainly being
developed in two contexts: philosophy, with the important contributions of
the Stoa and Epicurus; and philology, with the tentative rise of a more techni-
cally oriented grammar äs a by-product. It is important to realize that these
developments occur simultaneously—this is the reason why they are dis-
cussed in one section here.
The Stoa was founded in the early 3rd Century BCE, and its most important
thinker, Chrysippus, lived from ca 280-205 BCE . After Aristotle' s methodical
differentiation of the various scientific disciplines, the Stoa stressed the unity
of its System, and it grounded its ethics in particular on a scientific basis (cf.
Schmidt 1984:287). The 'wiseman' attains a stateoffreedom from emotional
disturbances (apatheia), because he knows that virtue is the only good. Thus,
he is able to form correct judgements about every Situation that presents itself
to him, and to evaluate it correctly. The constant correctness of these judge-
ments guarantees a continual state of tranquillity of mind. Judgements are
expressed in language, the bearer of truth and falsehood being the proposi-
tion. This is why language is an important topic for examination.
What happens when we form a judgement is the following: the material
world around us gives rise to presentations or impressions (phantasiai) that
are formed in our (equally material) souls. Our minds may either give their
assent to, or withhold it from such a presentation, which is always primary:
"For presentation comes first; then thought, which is capable of expressing itself, puts
into the form of discourse what it experiences through the presentation" (proegeitai
gär he phantasia, eith' he dianoia eklaletike huparkhousa, ho paskhei hupo tes
phantasias, toüto ekpherei logöi, Diogenes Laertius Lives of Eminent Philosophers
749).
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One way to classify presentations, is to divide them into "rational"
(logikaf) and "irrational" (alogoi) ones. A rational presentation (i.e. one
experienced by a rational being) is called a "thought process" (noesis)
(Diogenes Laertius 7.51). The Stoic theory of meaning is intricately linked
up with these views about epistemology and, through them, with ethics.
Stoic ideas of language are discussed under two headings, one dealing with
language' s formal aspects ("sound" ,phöne), the other with' 'meanings" (se-
mainomend) (Diogenes Laertius 7.43). Three elements are conjoined in any
given meaningful utterance: the signifier (semamon), the extra-linguistic
referent (tunkhanori) and the meaning (semainomenon) (Sextus Empiricus
Against the Professors 8.11 f.). Signifier and referent are corporeal, for they
can act or be acted upon (e.g. a word can travel from Speaker to listener).
Meaning is incorporeal, andremains unaffectedby whatever happens to either
the signifier or the referent. The Stoic chapter on the formal aspects of language
develops the idea of an implicative hierarchy: mere 'sound' is nothing but
battered air, verbal expression (lexis) is sound that can be captured in writing
(i.e. thatis articulate), discourse (logos) is meaningful sound that is sentforth
from the mind (Diogenes Laertius 7.55f.)· Notice that the concept of 'word'
is lacking. A sentence may be called lexis if abstraction is made from its mean-
ing, and the emphasis is on its characteristic of being articulate (writable)
speech. Latertheorymisunderstoodthispartof Stoic thought and reinterpreted
the distinctionbetween lexis and logos äs thatbetween 'word' and 'sentence'.
The Stoa probably took over Plato's and Aristotle's Suggestion of thought
being an internal dialogue, while meaningful language is thought that is ex-
pressed linguistically, in their distinction of a logos endiathetos "internal
reason/discourse" and a logos prophorikos "expressed reason/discourse".
The chapter on meanings includes the theory of presentations or impres-
sions (phantasiat) discussed above, but it also develops the notion of the
lekton, the Stoic locus for meaning par excellence. A lekton or "sayable"
is defmed äs "that which subsists according to a rational presentation" (to
katä phantasian logiken huphistamenon, Diogenes Laertius 7.63; Sextus
Empiricus 8.70). As we saw above, arational presentation, or thought-process
can be expressed in discourse, it is available to be expressed (i.e. 'sayable'),
and so, through it, is the fact or event in the material world that gave rise to
the presentation or Impression. In that sense 'meaning' is related to thought-
content in Stoic theory like it was in Aristotle. On the other hand, it does not
simply equal the thought-process (which is in itself material, because it is
mind in a certain condition), but it "subsists in accordance with it". The
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unusual verb "to subsist" (huphestanai) is used, because lekta do not 'exist'
in the füll sense of the word, they are ' somethings', but they do not fall under
theconceptof 'being'(Long&Sedley i987:I,i62ff.).Liketheotherincorpo-
real items in Stoic ontology, time, place and the void, they 'subsist' only. The
incorporeal nature of the lekton is stressed by Seneca (Leiters to Lucilius
117.13). The Stoics thus gave a place in their ontology to states of affairs of
the form 'that Cato walks', äs opposed to the material Cato and his material
walking. As Seneca puts it: "it makes all the difference whether you name
a thing or speak about it" (plurimum autem interest utrum illud dicas an de
illo, Leiters to Lucilius 117.13).
Lekta can be either complete or incomplete, and, interestingly, this depends
on the completeness of the expression. A predicate like 'writes' is an incom-
plete expression, representing an incomplete lekton, for we ask ourselves:
"who writes?". Thus, a predicate is an incomplete lekton. It is the 'incom-
plete meaning' corresponding to e.g. a verb on the level of the expression.
The Standard example of a complete lekton is the axiom or proposition, the
bearer of truth and falsehood (Diogenes Laertius 7.63). A predicate requires
a 'nominative case' in the open slot in order to produce an axiom, but the
'nominative case' itself is never called an incomplete lekton: to qualify äs
a lekton there has to be a propositional content, or the content of a speech-act.
This fits in with the difference between the Stoic logic of propositions äs
opposed to the Aristotelian logic of terms.
The relationship between expressions and lekta is especially interesting:
the restrictions of human language and thought make it necessary to talk
about these two items in isomorphic terms, but their elements do not have
a one-to-one correspondence. One expression may represent various lekta
and vice versa. Although according to the Stoa language was originally in
perfect rational order, the corruptions occurring with the passage of time
disturbed the primeval perfect economy of language, which included such
a one-to-one correspondence äs well äs complete perspicuity.
An example of disrupted perfection is the phenomenon of ambiguity.
Atherton (1993:53) points out the relevance of the ethical point of view in
this area äs well: expressions which could give rise to two or more interpreta-
tions could mislead the would-be wise man inadvertently to give his assent
to a false presentation, and that in turn could endanger his success äs a moral
agent, i.e. the achievement ofapatheia. The distinction between signifier and
referent solves the ambiguity of the 'Wagon', which seems to have occurred
independently in other grammatical traditions äs well:
"If you say something, it passes through your lips: now you say wagon, consequently
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a wagon passes through your lips" (ei ti laleis, toüto diä tau stomatos sou dierkhetai;
hamaxan de laleis; hamaxa am diä toü stomatos sou dierkhetai, Diogenes Laertius
Lives of Eminent Philosophers 7.187; tr. Hicks (cf. for füll references Atherton
1993:285^).
In their reading of Homer, the Stoics practised allegory, not so much to
show that Homer was a Proto-Stoic, but to prove that the truths they presented
could boast a long pedigree. In fact, it is likely that they believed that Homer
himself could not understand the deep truths hidden in his work anymore.
Again, the passage of time had corrupted original lucidity (cf. Long 1992).
Epicurus (341-271 BCE) showed an interest in language in two connec-
tions, namely its origin, and its epistemological role. He developed a philoso-
phy which aimed at procuring freedom of emotional disturbances (ataraxid),
by liberating mankind of fear of the gods and fear of death. The gods lead
a remote existence, far away from our world with which they do not interfere
at all. This theory gave Epicurus a vested interest in stressing the original
naturalness of language, which according to him came into being without any
divine Intervention. When mankind further developed and organized its
rudimentary language, however, an element of arbitrariness and convention
was introduced.
More important for our present purposes are Epicurus' views on the rela-
tionship between language and knowledge. Epicurean phy sics is an atomistic
System, the world being material and built up out of clusters of atoms. Physi-
cal objects emit streams of particles, which form images. These Images are
received by the observer or hearer, and may or may not be an accurate reflec-
tion of the original object—some wear and tear may occur during transmis-
sion. On the receiving end, there is a Sensation (aisthesis) and/or a feeling
(pathos), which are in themselves criteria of truth: they are always (subjec-
tively) 'true' in the sense that they are completely determined by the image.
They are indubitable facts of experience (Long 1971:116). If these sensations
or feelings are 'clear', i.e. if they are accompanied by the "clear view"
(enargeia) and if they are compatible with the so-called "preconceptions"
(prolepseis), a judgement can be formed which is objectively true. It is these
preconceptions which form the Epicurean locus for 'meaning'.
"Preconception ... is äs it were a perception, or correct opinion, or conception, or
universal 'stored notion' (i.e. memory) of that which has frequently become evident
externally: e.g. 'Such and such a kind of thing is a man'. For äs soon äs the word 'man'
is uttered, immediately its outline also comes to mind by means of preconception, since
the senses give the lead. Thus what primarily underlies each name is something seif-
evident ... Nor would we have named something if we had not previously learnt its
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outline by means of preconception. Thus preconceptions are self-evident" (ten de
prolepsin legousin hoionel katalepsin e doxan orthen e ennoian e katholiken noesin
enapokeimenen, toutesti mnemen, toüpollakis exöthen phanentos, hown 'to toioüton
estin anthröpos'. hatna gär toi rhethenai anthröpos euthüs katä prolepsin kai ho tupos
autoü noeitai proegoumenön ton aistheseön. pantl oün onomati to protös hupo-
tetagmenon enarges esti... oud' an önomasamen ti meproteron autoü katä prolepsin
ton tupon mathontes. enargeis oün eisin hai prolepseis, Diogenes Laertius Lives of
eminent Philosophers 10.33,tr. Long & Sedley 1987:1,87^, adapted).
By repeatedly encountering a phenomenon and remembering those encoun-
ters, we acquire a generic notion of such an object of experience. It is this
concept which is naturally evoked by the name of that thing (cf. Long &
Sedley 1987:1,89). Conversely, we need such a concept in order to be able
to name a phenomenon in the first place. The "preconception" (prolepsis)
is the first thing that comes to rnind (proton ennoema, cf. Letter to Herodotus
38; 72), something underlying the sounds uttered (tä hupotetagmena tots
phthongois, Letter to Herodotus 37f.), and these preconceptions are 'self-
evident' or 'clear', i.e. they need no exterior validation. The two sources
which deny that Epicurean philosophy knows of any mediator between names
and things have a clear Stoic bias (Plutarch Against Colotes 1119F and Sextus
Empiricus Against the Professors 8.13): if they were looking for incorporeal
equivalents to Stoic lekta, the Epicurean theory would seem deficient indeed.
But the concept of prolepsis does mediate between the sounds (phthongof)
and things in the world.
Apart from the philosophical theories developed in the Hellenistic period,
this era also saw the rise of philology äs a separate and distinguished disci-
pline with the foundation of the Museum at Alexandria. By Sponsoring a
group of eminent scholars who were working on the cultural heritage of
Greece, the Ptolemies hoped to corroborate their claim to be the true heirs
of Alexander the Great, and of Greek culture (paideia) in general, which was
mainly embodied in the great Greek poets of the past, Homer prominent
among them. The three most famous philologists were Zenodotus (fl. 3rd
Century BCE, ist half), Aristophanes of Byzantium (ca. 255-180 BCE) and
Aristarchus (217-145 BCE).
Their interest in semantics is apparent from their lexicographical work:
Zenodotus composed lists of difficult words (Glossai), Aristophanes wrote
several lexicographical treatises organised around semantic fields, and form-
ing part of the larger work called Words (Lexeis), e.g. on Names ofKinship
(Onomata Suggenikä) and Names of Ages (Peri onomasias helikion).
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Callanan (i987:90ff.) collects the evidence for bis use of semantic criteria
in settling philological questions: he uses the concept of literal and metaphori-
cal usage, complete with the technical terms "properly/improperly used"
(kuriös/akurös) and "metaphor" (metaphorä). And he is also familiär with
the concepts of homonymy and the absence of a word that would fit a slot
in the lexical system (e.g. there is no Greek word that specifically describes
a brother' s wife)—this is the Democritean nonumon; Aristarchus himself does
not use any technical terminology for these latter two phenomena. He did
not write any lexica, but his commentaries contained numerous explanations
of poetic usage. In addition, of the three great Alexandrian philologists, it
is his exegetical principles that are most clearly identifiable: He tried to
explain Homer from Homer (whether or not that famous phrase can actually
be attributed to him), and asked for consistency and functionality in Homer' s
work. Where those characteristics seemed to be absent, he feit there was
reason to doubt the correctness of the transmission.
One of Aristarchus' pupils is Dionysius Thrax (2nd Century BCE). Th&Art
of Grammar that has come down to us under his name may or may not be
authentic, but it is certainly representative of the grammatical knowledge of
the time. It is a rather schematic overview of the tasks of the grammarian and
the parts of speech, with many subclassifications. Three out of six tasks of
the grammarian have a clear semantic component: "exegesis according to
the poetical expressions" (exegesis katä toüs enuparkhontas poietikoüs tro-
pous, i p. 5,4); "prompt rendering of poetical words and realia" (glösson
te kal historion prokheiros apodosis, i, p. 6,1); and "discovery of etymol-
ogy" (etumologias heuresis, i, p. 6,if.). Thebrief sectiononpunctuationde-
fines both the full-stop and the comma in relation to the question whether or
notthe"thoughthasbeencompleted" (e..g.dianoiasapertismenes,4,p.j,5).
Similarly, the sentence is defmed äs "a composite prose expression, indicat-
ing a complete thought" (pezes lexeös sunthesis dianoian autoteledeloüsa).
Some of the definitions of the parts of speech have a semantic component
(e.g. the noun "signifies a body or a thing" (soma eprägma semamori), the
verb signifies an action or passion, and the pronoun indicates previously iden-
tified persons). Moreover, the noun and the adverb are further classified
according to semantic criteria. In the case of the noun such a classification
is applied twice. First it affects the subtypes of derived nouns, and then it is
used to categorize the nouns äs a whole. Interestingly, the subclassification
of the derived nouns is itself a mix of semantic and morphological criteria.
Derived nouns can be patronymics, words indicating possession, compara-
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tives, superlatives, terms of endearment, but also (and there is no indication
that we are on a different level here) words derived from nouns, or from verbs
(12, p. 25,3».).
Although semantic criteria have a considerable relevance, there is no
explicit theory of meaning in Alexandrian grammar. The notion that meaning
resides on the level of the proposition only is clearly abandoned, in favour
of a view which attributes meaning to individual words. For the first time,
the notions of word and sentence Start playing a role.
Philology became an intellectual trend in this period, to the extent that it
actually influenced the modes of thought in non-linguistic disciplines like
medicine. The works attributed to the great 5th-century-BCE physician Hip-
pocrates attracted the same kind of philological attention äs did Homer.
Lexica and commentaries were being produced, and, clearly, the predominant
interest in Hippocrates' medical information and the virtual irrelevance of
his literary qualities promoted an even stronger concentration of what the
texts actually meant—at least this is what the exegetes themselves claim. In
fact, however, the dominant literary paradigm and its requirements do influ-
ence their interpretations. Apart from medicine, in the 2nd Century BCE the
philosophical texts by Epicurus were the object of a commentary by Deme-
trius Lacon, who also applied philological tools to elucidate the meaning of
Epicurus' words. Unclarities in the work of the master had to be eliminated,
because they disturbed the tranquillity of mind of his followers, the very goal
of Epicurean philosophy. As in the Stoic theory of ambiguity, an ethical
motivation validates the study of language and texts. A whole stream of
philosophical and technical commentaries on great authoritative texts by past
masters was to follow. Neo-Platonists (commenting on Plato and Aristotle)
and Christians (commenting on the Bible), developed exegetical and herme-
neutic principles, for instance, that a text should be interpreted in view of a
unified theme (Jamblichus, 3rd Century CE), even if read on different levels;
or that true understanding was a matter of Inspiration. They also looked for
criteria on the basis of which one could decide whether texts were to be read
literally or allegorically. However, no new theories of linguistic meaning
were generated in this context.
9. Apollonius Dyscolus: the role of semantics in syntactic theory
The grammarian Apollonius Dyscolus (2nd Century CE) wrote an extensive
oeuvre, which has only partially come down to us. Apart from three minor
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works (On Pronouns, On Adverbs and On Conjunctions) and some fragments,
we have his four books On Syntax. Apollonius made a substantial contribu-
tion towards making grammar an autonomous discipline. He wants to provide
a framework for problem-solving, which can be used by philologists, who
try to establish the correct text of their literary authors (diorthösis), rhetori-
cians and philosophers, who look for linguistic purity and correctness
(Hellenismus) and orthographers, who investigate criteria for correct spelling.
Apollonius is indebted to all of these groups, especially to the (Stoic) philoso-
phers, but his own work Claims to provide a new and independent method
for all of them. Part of his conceptual linguistic model is philosophical in
origin, but Apollonius is not committed to Stoic philosophy. Part of his input
may be Stoic, but his Output is his own.
According to Apollonius, language is an orderly System, with a hierarchy
of levels, ascending from letters, to syllables, to words, through concepts,
to the meaningful and grammatically sound sentence (autoteles logos) (On
Syntax 1,2, 2.3ff.). There is isomorphism between the several levels: their
Organisation is structurally identical and the orderly and regulär combination
of elements from each level forms those of a higher one. The complete
sentence can be formed by words, because upon each word an intelligible
(concept), a meaning that can be thought (noeton) is grafted, and these mean-
ings are the elements (stoikheia, the same word is used for "letters") of the
meaningful and complete sentence:
"And just äs the elements [i.e. letters] in their combinations complete syllables, so too
does the syntax of the intelligibles complete syllables in a certain sense, through the
combination of words. Again, äs the word comes from the syllables, so does the com-
plete sentence come from the regularity (symmetrical congruence) of the intelligibles"
(kalhos tästoikheia tässullabäsapoteleikatä täsepiplokas, houtökalhesuntaxiston
noeton tropon tinä sullabäs apotelesei diä tis epiplokes tön lexeön. kal eti hon tropon
ek tön sullabon he lexis, houtös ek tes katallelotetos ton noeton ho autoteles logos, On
Syntax 1,2, 2.iiff.; tr. Blank 1983:30).
The rational and regulär structure of language makes it possible for the
grammarian to deduce rules according to strictly rational principles, rational
orderliness being the main criterion for linguistic correctness. Other criteria
are the established usage of cultivated people, literary precedents, and the
authority of previous scholars. All these criteria are used to track down and
diagnose phenomena of "grammatical irregularity" (tö akatallelon), and to
establish the "regularity of the complete sentence" (katallelotes toü
autoteloüs logou).
A sentence is "regulär" (katallelos) if all its parts are syntactically congru-
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ent and semantically compatible. "Regularity" (katallelotes) refers to the
mutual relationships of the constituents of a sentence; it is the notion into
which symmetry of structure and semantics merge. In fact, syntax—the Greek
word suntaxis means no more than the combination/collocation of words,
or constituents—is a function of semantics. The reason why certain words
can be combined, whereas others yield an ungrammatical construction, must
be sought on the level of meaning.
The central portion of the On Syntax (the opening section of book m) is
devoted to an explanation of the phenomenon of ungrammaticality. What are
its causes? Words have a certain (lexical) meaning, but apart from that they
also carry information imparted through inflection (e.g. tense, voice, mood,
number, case, gender). Two words will be regularly and grammatically
construed if all information conveyed by them is compatible (On Syntax
111,14, 280.iff.). If a word is unmarked for a certain category (e.g. an in-
declinable pari of Speech like the adverb is unmarked for case), it cannot be
incompatible with information conveyed by that category in the rest of the
sentence, because it cannot be demonstrated to be incorrect by the Substitution
of a better alternative (111,17, 282. iff.). This is expressed e.g. in the phrase:
"No part of speech can be ungrammatical in respect of a category which it fails to
distinguish" (ouden meros logou ginetai akatallelon en höime diekrithe, On Syntax
111,51, 3i6.ioff.; tr. Householder).
Adverbs are usually not marked for tense, since they are indeclinable. There-
fore, the adverb 'here' can be construed with all tenses. But a word like 'yes-
terday' does convey a temporal sense in its lexical meaning, and this explains
why it cannot be construed with a future tense.
'Meaning' and 'intelligibles' are the substance of regularity, but they are
emphatically tied to the level of the expression. If someone points at a woman
and complains 'he has beaten me', nothing is wrong with the grammaticality
and regularity of the sentence. Katallelotes is defmitely a characteristic of
language rather than a function of the relation between language and reality.
The same plaintiff exclaiming: 'she have beaten me' does produce an un-
grammatical sentence, even if he successfully points out the culprit:
"For irregularity or regularity are not to be found in the substance of discourse (tots
hupokeimenois), but in the combination of the words" (ou gär en tots hupokeimenois
to akatallelon estin e katallelon, en de tet suntaxei ton lexeön, On Syntax 111,10,
275.6ff.).
Apollomus' problem-solving approachis diagnostic innature: eventhough
an expression seems to be familiär and in order, it can still be incorrect, and
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the grammarian who follows Apollonius' logical principles will be able to
demonstrate this. He will reveal incorrect usage by substituting a (more)
correct alternative. Thus, correct usage refutes the incorrect, a principle styled
elenkhos.
Apollonius' view of language is normative. Originally, language was in
perfect regulär order and there was a one-to-on&relationship between words
and meanings. However, that order has been disturbed and corrupted over
time. The grammarian needs to understand the basic regularity in order to
be able to correct mistakes, or to explain the rules underlying an aberration.
On the other hand, Apollonius is no reformer nor does he demand a return
to the pristine state of language. He wants to understand the linguistic system
and to correct those (new) mistakes which are not integral to linguistic usage
already. He shows, for instance, that the Greek idiom which construes a
neuter plural subject with a predicate in the singular is strictly speaking
irregulär, but he does not propose to abolish it (On Syntax 111,50, 315.i6ff.;
Schenkeveld 1994:29511".). In order to explain the 'regulär meaning' of a
given Greek sentence, he has to take recourse to a paraphrase in normalized
Greek, which purports to represent äs regularly äs possible all aspects of the
meaning of the sentence in question (in fact, the lektori). Such paraphrases
or translations into structurally perspicuous, truly regulär sentences are called
to hexes, "the orderly Version". Here, the original one-to-one correspondence
between words and meanings is artificially restored.
It will be clear from the foregoing that Apollonius works with the Stoic
dichotomy between sounds (phönai) and meanings (semainomena). His three
minor works reflect this dichotomy in their structure. Apollonius always
opens with a discussion of the various defmitions and names for a given part
of speech, their syntax (or place in the sentence) and examples of words
which may or may not belong to this particular part of speech. All of this
comes under the heading of "sense, meaning" (ennoia); notice especially
that this also holds good for syntax. After that he will turn to a discussion of
the morphology of the relevant part of speech (skhema tes phönSs).
Meaning is always intrinsically more important than form. Not only is it
the determining factor in establishing grammatical regularity (katallelotes),
it is also meaning which is decisive for assigning a word to one part of speech
rather than another (merismos). Forms of words may undergo various chan-
ges, but these cannot affect their meaning. In this sense, Apollonius is an
interesting Illustration of the fact that ancient grammar mainly concentrates
on two levels, the morphological one (cf. his interest in parsing (merismos)),
210 THE EMERGENCE OF SEMANTICS
and the semanto-logical one (cf. bis interest in meaning). Syntax in our sense
of the word, äs a purely grammatico-structural phenomenon, hardly plays
any role.
10. Augustine: semantics and theology
Augustine (354-430 CE) was well-versed in pagan scholarship, although he
had had a slow start. Before his conversion to Christianity, he specialized in
rhetoric. After his conversion, he wrote on the liberal arts (treatises on gram-
mar and dialectic are extant) and developed a programme for a Christian
education. His ideas on language and the problem of meaning are deeply
influenced by previous philosophical scholarship, although heavily filtered
through Roman sources and schooltexts. Augustine' s command of Greek was
poor and he is not likely to have studied the relevant sources (especially the
Stoic ones) in any great depth. The resulting theories are thoroughly Chris-
tianized and often original. The works that are most relevant here are On
Dialectic (386-7 CE), On the Teacher (ca. 389), On Christian Culture (397,
part of book 3 and all of book4 was written in 427), and On the Trinity (415).
In On Dialectic Augustine is the first firmly to incorporate the study of
the linguistic sign into a general theory of signs; in Hellenistic philosophy
language had never been regarded äs the System of signs par excellence,
although a theory of sign-inference had been important in both Stoic and
Epicurean philosophy. Augustine identifies the word äs the locus for mean-
ing. A word is the smallest combination of signifier and signified. This latter
dichotomy is Stoic in origin, but Augustine' s application of the theory is new
in that Stoic theory had no place for the concept of 'word' at all. They distin-
guished strings of articulated sound (lexis) and meaningful articulated sound
äs found in a proposition (logos). Augustine's theory is a blend of Stoic
philosophical influence and Roman school grammar, which focused entirely
on words.
On Dialectic refines the Latin terminology to express the distinctions that
apply to any given expression: a word (verburri) qua physical sound (sonus)
is opposed to that aspect that is grasped not by the ears, but by the mind, the
dicibile "sayable", a calque on the Stoic lekton, although lekton is never
related to words in Isolation. The referent is distinct from this "meaning":
it is called res, equivalent to Greek prägma in the trivial, non-Stoic sense.
A further distinction is made between words that are used to refer to them-
selves, in which case their res is equivalent to verbum, and words which are
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not used autonomously, but to signify something eise: in that case the techni-
cal term is dictio (On Dialectic 5). Any given word is therefore a nodal point
in which four aspects converge: verbum, dicibile, dictio and res. Augustine
is the first systematically to distinguish 'use' and 'mention' of a word in his
terminology.
Aristotelian influence may be detected in Augustine's view that written
language is a sign of spoken language:
"Every word is a sound, for when it is written it is not a word but the sign of a word"
(Omne verbum sonat. Cum enim est in scripto, non verbum sed verbi signum est, On
Dialectic 5; tr. Jackson).
In the dialogue On the Teacher the relationship between language and
knowledge is investigated. The two basic functions of language are to teach
(cf. Plato) and to remind, but after a first half in which it is argued that it is
impossible to learn anything without signs, the second half of the dialogue
leads to an impasse: for it is argued that signs are learned and understood
from the things of which they are signs, and not vice versa (X,33). We need
knowledge, before we can understand signs. Therefore, language by itself
cannot teach us anything. The solution to this dilemma is theological: getting
to know intelligibles can only come about through revelation. The interior
teacher is the Word, Christ, who "can teach by at once displaying to the mind
the reality to be known and providing the language for its underStanding"
(Markus 1957:69) (cf. On the Teacher xn,39).
Some of these ideas are further developed in On the Trinity, when Augus-
tine comes to reflect on the nature of the Word. The 'interior word' is an
abstract concept in that it is unrelated to any particular language (in that sense
it resembles the 'Form' or 'Idea' (eidos) of the first theory of meaning in the
Cratylus (see above, Section 6). The "word which is luminous inside"
(verbum quod intus lucet) is opposed to its external realisation, the "word
heard sounding outside" (verbum quodforis sonat) (On the Trinity χ ν, 11.20;
Markus 1957:77). Communication is realized because the internal word in
the interlocutor's mind is activated by Speech addressed to him. The distinc-
tion is reminiscent of the theory of "internal" and "expressed reason/dis-
course", the logos endiathetos and the logos prophorikos.
On Christian Culture is the first systematic attempt to develop a Christian
curriculum, preparing for an adequate Interpretation of the Bible. The process
of communication is described äs follows:
"When we speak, the word that we carry in our hearts turns into sound, in order that what
we carry in our mind may glide into the mind of the hearer through his carnal ears. It
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is called expression. However, it is not our thought that is converted into that same
sound, but our thought remains intact with itself; it takes on the form of the words in
which it insinuates itself into the ears, without being affected by any kind of internal
change" (cum loquimur, ut id quod animo gerimus in audientis animum per aures
carneas iüabatur,fit sonus verbum quod corde gestamus, et locutio vocatur; nee tarnen
in eundem sonum cogitatio nostra convertitur, sed apud se manens integra, formam
vocis qua se insinuet auribus, sine aliqua labe suae mutationis assum.it, On Christian
Culture 1,13.12).
Discourse is a transfer of thought from one mind to the other through the
temporary physical medium of sound. The fact that the internal word,
thought, remains intact and complete is important because of the analogy with
the Incarnation of God' s Word. The general framework for the Interpretation
of the Bible is equally determined by religious considerations: the starting-
point for every Interpretation is love of God and of one's neighbour, and the
triad faith, hope and love (1,35.39; 374iff.).
In the following books (especially book π) Augustine takes up the theory
of signs, of which words are the prime examples. He draws a distinction
between "signs" (signa) and "things" (res), pointing out that signs are
things, too, but that not all things are signs. In the case of words, it is almost
exclusively their nature of being signs that is relevant. A sign is defined äs
follows:
"A sign ... is a thing which, in addition to what it is perceived to be by the senses also
brings something eise to mind" (signum ... est res, praeter speciem quam ingerit
sensibusaliud aliquid ex sefaciens incogitationemvenire, On Christian Culturell,!.!;
tr. Markus 1957:71).
Signs can be divided into 'natural' ones and 'given' ones. Words belong to
the latter class, and derive their meaning from convention, or consensus.
After a discussion of the general education necessary to the would-be
Interpreter of the Bible, Augustine devotes the third book to the problem of
ambiguity. Some contexts are not immediately transparent and it is imperative
that the exegete know how to deal with these. In literal expressions, ambigu-
ity will usually be solved by the context, a comparison of different transla-
tions or a comparison with the original (111,4.8). To prevent error and heresy,
it is crucial to be able to determine when a text is to be taken literally and
when figuratively (in ,5.9; ι ο. 14). In this book he integrales pagan hermeneu-
tics and pagan education in a completely Christian framework. His criteria
are in part familiär from the pagan tradition (cf. above), e.g. if the surface
meaning of the text yields an unacceptable meaning, it should be interpreted
allegorically. The historical framework should be taken into account, so that
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something which can be taken literally in the time in which it was written
should not be interpreted allegorically in Augustine's time (111,22.32) (a
principle already known to Aristotle and to Aristarchus). Augustine also
advocates the principle of explaining the Bible from the Bible (e.g.
111,27.38f.). However, his particular slant is completely Christianized, the
final test being whether or not a text is compatible with the prime directives
of love of God and of one's neighbour (111,10.14). It is very interesting that
Augustine stipulates explicitly that the text of the Bible can carry more than
one meaning simultaneously: all these meanings have been foreseen and
intended by the Holy Spirit (111,27.38).
Augustine's unique achievement was to adopt and adapt the pagan philo-
sophical heritage in such a way that it came to be an acceptable basis for the
Christian Middle Age. This goes in particular for the analogies he sees be-
tween the human word and the Word, second person of the Holy Trinity,
which preserves its integrity and completeness while it is transferred through
a physical medium from one person to another. Communication and revela-
tion are put on an analogical footing.
l l . Semantics and translations
Early Greek exegetical techniques included paraphrase and the replacement
of difficult poetical words with more ordinary prosaic ones. Translation of
a word into synonymous expressions (metalepsis) was to remain common
scholiast practice, and it was an important way to establish the semantic
content of a word for a grammarian like Apollonius Dyscolus (cf. Sluiter
1990:11 iff.). The Greek dialects, too, posed problems of 'translation' into
the dominant Attic or Koine. However, translations from foreign languages
into Greek or vice versa are virtually absent from Greek linguistic thought.
The Greeks did not have any particular systematic interest in other languages,
although one does find the incidental comparison of words, and although
there must have been numerous Interpreters in cosmopolitan cities like Athens
and Alexandria. Very little by way of linguistic comparison is to be found
in Greek technical literature. Where literary works are concerned, Herodotus
has incidental remarks about the words other people use for certain phenom-
ena, and Aristophanes pokes fun at the incomprehensible gibberish of for-
eigners (e.g. in hisAcharnians). Other tongues were styled "barbarian", and
were compared to animal sounds (especially twittering birds, e.g. Aeschylus
Agamemnon 1050-53, cf. Sluiter 1990:206).
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In fact, mutual incomprehension between Greeks and foreigners, rather
than the possibility of translation is what one finds mainly stressed in the
theoretical literature about language. Greeks can perceive the sounds of a
barbarian language, they can distinguish the vocal inflections, but that does
not give them the knowledge of an Interpreter, i.e. the meaning of the words
remains obscure to them (Plato Theaetetus i63biff.). Earlier, Heraclitus had
already pointed out that eyes and ears are poor witnesses if one has a barbar-
ian soul, i.e. if the sense-data fail to be interpreted correctly (Fr. B 107). The
Stoics define 'meaning' with reference to its availability to "foreigners"
(barbaroi): they hear the sounds (phöne) which carry the meaning, but are
still unable to grasp it (Sextus Empiricus Against the Professors 8.12). In fact
this proves thai phöne äs such is meaningless: if it were meaningful, perceiv-
ing the sounds would entail grasping the meaning, but in fact foreigners
(barbaroi) are unable to do this (Sextus Empiricus Against the Professors
8.134, cf. i. 155). Sextus uses the same point to prove that discourse does not
signify "by nature" (phusei). This appears from the fact that not everyone
understands everyone eise, but that there is a mutual lack of communication
between Greeks and foreigners, and even between Greeks and Greeks, and
foreigners and foreigners (Sextus Empiricus Against the Professors i-37f.,
cf. Outlines of Pyrrhonism 2.214 and 3.267). This link between the conven-
tional nature of language and the fact that writing and sounds are not the same
for everyone goes back to Plato (Cratylus 385d9ff.) and Aristotle's On
Interpretation i (i6a4ff.).
The first major translation project in the Greek world was that of the
Septuagint (2nd Century BCE), but no theory of translation was required at
that point, because it was claimed that the Greek end-result itself was the
product of divine Inspiration, seventy-two translators having separately and
independently produced an identical Version.
For explicit theories of translation we have to wait until the Romans, who
used Greek äs a metalanguage, whenever they were talking about the Latin
language. This goes especially for the Roman grammarians, but it is also
evident from observations like those of Augustine, who notices that some
expressions are ambiguous, because they mean one thing in Greek and
another in Latin (e.g. lege is Greek for "read" (imperative) and Latin for
"law" (in the ablative case), On Christian Culture 1,24.37). This is, of
course, a late example (end 4th Century CE), but right from the beginning the
Romans were very conscious of the existence of Greek äs a 'Kultursprache';
indeed, for a long time it was not certain whether Latin would ever acquire
THE GREEK TRADITION 215
a similar Status in its own right. A Roman annalist like Fabius Pictor (3rd/2nd
Century BCE) wrote bis works directly in Greek. The first Latin poet was in
fact a Greek, Livius Andronicus, who translated the Odyssey into Latin (3rd
Century BCE). Early comic poets, like Plautus (250-184 BCE) and Terence
(2nd Century BCE), heavily relied on Greek examples and translated parts of
them, although they managed to produce something new and uniquely Roman
in the process. Terence has the prologue-speaker in hisAdelphoe recommend
him for the faithfulness of his translation:
"He has translated it word for word" (verbum de verbo expressum extulit, Adelphoe 11).
In the ist Century BCE we find more theoretical reflections on the process
of translation äs such. It is once again the translation of Greek poetry that
triggers Horace' s remark that one should notbe too compulsive about follow-
ing one's model (Ars Poetica 133). The project of giving the Romans their
own philosophical terminology was undertaken by Cicero and Lucretius.
Cicero frequently reflects on this enterprise, and he feels strongly that one
should notbe too literal-minded while translating. Incidentally he will suggest
a word-for-word (verbum e verbo) isomorphic translation (e.g. Lucullus 17),
which amounts to a calque, e.g. conprehensio for Greek katalepsis. Usually,
however, he is disparaging about this behaviour which befits a mere Inter-
preter: he prefers remodelling his example äs an orator should (On the Best
Type of Orator 14; de Finibus 3.15): he wants to translate not the words, but
the force, the meaning (non verba, sed vim, Academica i.io). Neologisms
are not forbidden, but one should look for a natural equivalent, paraphrase
if necessary, or take over a Greek word äs a technical term (de Finibus 3.15).
The ist-century-CE philosopher Seneca agrees with him in his rejection of
word-for-word isomorphism:
"This abiding stability of mind the Greeks call 'euthymia', 'well-being of the soul' ...;
I call it tranquillity. For there is no need to imitate and reproduce words in their Greek
shape; the thing itself, which is under discussion, must be designated by some name
which ought to have, not the form, but the force, of the Greek term" (Hanc stabilem
animi sedem Graeci euthymian vocant...; ego tranquilütatem voco. Nee enim imitari
et transferre verba ad ülorum formam necesse est; res ipsa, de qua agitur, aliquo
signanda nomine est, quod appellationis Graecae vim debet höhere, non fadem, On
Tranquillity ofMind 2.3).
And when looking for a translation of the Greek apatheia "non-suffering"
in the sense of "freedom from affections and emotional disturbances", he
equally rejects the formation of the calque impatientia ("non-suffering"; the
word was already in use äs "impatience") (Leiters to Lucilius 9.2).
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In the Roman world, too, the translation of the Bible was a major event.
Jerome (4th Century CE), who translated the Bible into Latin, composes a long
letter which forms a treatise on the best style of translation (Leiters 57). The
letter was not instigated by his translation of the Bible, however, but was
written after he had been attacked for a sloppy translation of a Greek letter.
In his defense, he firmly places himself in the tradition of Horace, Cicero and
Seneca, rejecting a literaüstic approach in favour of one aiming to convey
the Intention of the words. He makes an exception for Bible translations,
which, however, is not always reflected in his actual translations (cf. Barte-
link 1980):
"For not only do I admit, but I even freely proclaim that when I translate Greek texts,
with the exception of Holy Scripture where even the Word order is a mystery, I do not
translate word-for-word, but meaning for meaning" (Ego enim non solumfateor, sed
libera voce profiteor me in interpretatione Graecorum absque scripturis sanctis, ubi
et verborum ordo mysterium est, non verbum e verbo, sed sensum exprimere de sensu,
Leiters 57.5)
Augustine thought Jerome' s translation was rather too free, and preferred the
old-fashioned Itala on the grounds that it "clung more closely to the words"
(est verborum tenacior) "while the intention is clear" (cum perspicuitate
sententiae, On Christian Culture 11,15.22. This combination is obviously the
most ideal.
Clearly, the Opposition between words and meanings was completely
internalized by the i st Century BCE . It was also realized that a preference for
a translation ad sensum would enhance the literary quality of the translation
(this is Jerome's point), while a literal translation shows the faithfulness of
the plodding Interpreter. As so often, the ideal solution was the middle road.
12. Conclusion
In this essay we have tried to show the central role of meaning in Greek
linguistic thought. In a way, the earliest emergence of linguistic concerns in
the form of etymology set the tone for what was to come. Etymology was
a strategy to get a sense of control over a baffling world, an attempt to under-
stand the world through language. It focused on single words, especially
names. Interpretation of larger contexts is attested at an early stage in the
form of explaining dreams and oracles, taken äs divine Communications.
Once the focus of attention, the nature of language kept occupying the
Greek intellectuals: its potential for persuasion and entertainment was ex-
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plored by the sophists, who lay the foundation of theoretical rhetoric and
poetical theory. The relationship between language and knowledge, and
language and the outside world occupied the philosophers who started where
the poets had left off. Plato feels compelled to address these problems, be-
cause contemporary speculation seemed to undermine the whole enterprise
of dialectic. The first of the two theories of meaning put forward in the Craty-
lus locates meaning in the ideal Form of a name, which the name-giver has
to keep in view. Alternatively, a name is feit to represent the namegiver' s view
of reality. Plato assigns language its proper place in the dialectical process:
it is its Instrument and vehicle, but it does not form a fit object for research
in and of itself, nor is it a reliable source of Information about the world: at
best, it represents the name-givers' opinions of the world. In the Sophist, it
is recognized that propositional meaning (and, therefore, truth and falsity)
resides, not in the single word, but in a syntactically complete sentence.
Aristotle agrees that language can represent established opinion, but in his
eyes common opinions and expressions form a legitimate starting-point for
philosophical inquiry. However, he does not endorse reliance on etymology,
which can only be used äs a back-up argument, not in the course of establish-
ing scholarly proof. Aristotle' s view of language äs a conventional symbolic,
rather man mimetic, System was to revolutionize linguistic thought. In his
mentalistic view, language signifies the Speaker's thoughts.
In the Hellenistic period, important contributions to the theory of meaning
were made by the Epicureans, but especially by the Stoics. Their radical
distinction between form and meaning, not in the context of the single
word—which play s no role whatsoever—, but in that of the proposition came
to form pari of the common stock of linguistic concepts at the disposal of
every educated Greek. Meaning is something incorporeal, subsistent on
thought, that has the potential to be expressed in language—hence its name:
"sayable" (lektori). Now that meaning was recognized äs having an identity
of its own, different from sound, concept or thing, theoretically the way was
made clear for a purely linguistic approach to semantics, äs opposed to a
logical one; however, this was not to happen in Antiquity. Both the Stoics
and the Epicureans had good philosophical motives for studying language:
misunderstanding this vehicle for thought was a severe threat to the ultimate
attainment of a philosopher's happiness.
In the same period, the Museum at Alexandria was established, Center for
Hellenic Studies avant la lettre, where philology was the intellectual fashion
of the day, because it was the Instrument to preserve the cultural inheritance
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of archaic and classical Greece. The Interpretation of the poets, Homer
prominent among them, had always formed part of the Greek intellectual
tradition and the school curriculum. Now, it became a separate discipline,
philology. Apart from lexicography, interpretive principles were established
to determine whether the texts of the great poets were in good order. Philoso-
phers and doctors followed the intellectual trend, and applied the tools of
philology to write commentaries and lexica on the authoritative works from
their respective traditions, Epicurus, Plato, Aristotle, and Hippocrates.
This whole tradition of studying the meaning of language in whichever
form, was probably one of the main reasons why no Greek equivalent of a
purely structural syntax ever emerged. Language was either studied at the
basic level of the single word, or for its communicative or logical value. The
intermediate stage was not skipped altogether, but observations pertaining
to the formal syntactic structure of language are rather incidental. The word
'syntax' had been around for a long time, but meant no more than the combi-
nation or the collocation of lexical items to achieve a certain effect. This
focus on the meaning of language, on its communicative function, is also
central to the work of the 'syntactician' Apollonius Dyscolus, in which
semantical concerns came to form the basis of a theory of grammatical
regularity (katallelotes). He focuses mainly on the construction of the com-
plete sentence, expressing a complete meaning.
In the work of Augustine, a synthesis is achieved between the pagan
philosophical, rhetorical and philological tradition, and Christian religion:
he develops a Christian curriculum for the ideal exegete of the Bible. Augus-
tine is the first to make a clear distinction between 'use' and 'mention'. He
explicitly redirects the search for meaning to the individual word, in a confir-
mation of the fact that the Stoics' concentration on the incorporeal proposi-
tion had been unable to win the day in school-practice.
Ancient theories of translation, the last topic briefly discussed here, corrob-
orate the fact that form-meaning distinctions had been completely absorbed
into ancient linguistic thought. Not surprisingly, a translation that stay s close
to the 'Wortlaut' of the original while atthe same time completely conveying
its meaning and Intention, is generally preferred.
13. Suggestions for further reading
i. The best general introduction to the Greek grammatical tradition is proba-
bly still Steinthal (1890-91) and Pfeiffer (1968). A brief survey of ancient
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views on 'meaning' is tobefoundin Calboli (1992). Manetti (1987) discusses
ancient theories of signs. Di Cesare (1980) deals with ancient philosophical
theories of meaning (up to and including the Epicureans, but without the
Stoics).
2. For Greek grammatical terminology, see also Becares Botas (1985).
3. See Kraus (1987) on the relationships between words and things. Amsler
(i989) deals with etymology; he focuses mainly on later antiquity, but gives
a useful survey of earlier material. Good general discussion of etymology
in Herbermann 1991. Rank (1951) is still indispensable on Homeric etymol-
ogy; on Homeric names, Peradotto (1990) is good. Leclerc (1993) deals with
Hesiod's views on language and names. For Aristotle's use of etymology,
see Eucken (1869:246)
4. For pre-Alexandrian exegetical techniques, see Manetti (1987) (on signs);
Sluiter (1994) (Themistocles' Interpretation of the Delphic oracle).
Paraphrastic techniques and glosses in Plato: Bottin (1975). On allegory:
Buffiere (1956), who is also indispensable for Homeric interpretations in
antiquity in general; Whitman (1987), see also under 8.
5. General survey of linguistic ideas in the Pre-Socratics in Schmitter (1991)
andDi Cesare (1980); onHeraclitus' theory of meaning, seeHussey (1982).
For the sophists, see Di Cesare (i 991), for Prodicus, Momigliano (1929-30),
for Gorgias, Kraus (1987:17iff.) andDi Cesare (1991:95f.)· Heinimann (1945
(i 972)) is still fundamental on the Opposition nomos—phusis, characteristic
of the intellectual outlook of the period.
6. Derbolav (1972) provides a survey of the extensive literature on Plato's
Cratylus. Goldschmidt's essay (1940) is still important. Of the more recent
literature, see especially Denyer (1991) on the problem of truth and falsehood,
and Baxter (1992) on the theory of names and the etymological section.
7. Excellent overview of the Aristotelian philosophy of language in Ax
(1992), see also Flashar (1983). Arens (1984) discusses the vital first section
of On Interpretation, for which see further Montanari (1984; 1988) and
Weidemann (1994).
8. For Hellenistic philosophy, see Long & Sedley 1987, who collectthe most
important sources with translations and commentary. On Stoic semantics,
see Frede (1978), Egli (1986), Sluiter (I990:i3ff. and forme.) and Hülser
(1992). Schenkeveld (1984:326-31) discusses the parallels between the Stoic
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theory of lekta and Searle's Speech act theory. For Stoic allegoresis,
Steinmetz (1986), Most (1989) and Long (1992). Epicurean semantics is
discussed in Long (1971), Sedley (1973), and Hossenfelder (1991). Glidden
(1983) takes a different view from the one expounded here. For Alexandrian
philology, see, apart from Pfeiffer (1968), Callanan (1987) with the critical
discussion and corrections in Schenkeveld (1990). On the Techne ascribed
to Dionysius Thrax, see Law and Sluiter (1995).
9. Apollonius Dyscolus On Syntax is available in the English Version by
Householder (1981) (a new translation is being prepared by Jean Lallot). For
discussions of Apollonius' semantic views, see Blank (1982 and 1993), and
Sluiter (1990). Van Ophuijsen (1993) provides a discussion of some of the
relevant technical terms from the semantic field of 'meaning', notably
prägma, diathesis, ennoia, and paremphainein and related terms.
10. Rotta (1909) discusses theories of language in patristic authors. For
Augustine, see especially Markus (1957) andB aratin (1981); further Gangutia
(1977) and Manetti (1987).
11. On ancient theories of translation, see Bartelink (1980). On the general
issue, of course, Steiner (I9922).
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